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Since 1990 many countries have started a deregulation process in the electricity wholesale
market with a view to gaining in efficiency, lowering prices and encouraging investments. In
most of the markets these objectives have been attained, but at the same time prices have
shown high volatility. This is mainly due to certain unique characteristics of electricity: it
cannot be easily stored; and the flow across lines is dependent on the laws of physics.
Electricity price variance has been studied very little. Variance is important for con-
structing prediction intervals for the price. And it is a key factor in pricing derivatives,
which are used for energy risk management purposes.
A fundamental bid-based stochastic model is presented to predict electricity hourly prices
and average price in a given period. The model captures both the economic and physical
aspects of the pricing process, considering two sources of uncertainty: availability of the units
and demand. This work is based on three oligopoly models —Bertrand, Cournot and Supply
Function Equilibrium (SFE) due to Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen— and obtains closed
form expressions for expected value and variance of electricity hourly prices and average
price.
Sensitivity analysis is performed on the number of firms, anticipated peak demand and
price elasticity of demand. The results show that as the number of firms in the market
iv
decreases, the expected values of prices increase by a significant amount. Variances for the
Cournot model also increase. But the variances for the SFE model decrease, taking even
smaller values than Bertrand’s. Thus if the Rudkevich model is an accurate representation
of the electricity market, the results show that an introduction of competition may decrease
the expected value of prices but the variances may actually increase.
Price elasticity of demand severely affects expected values and variances in the Cournot
model. So does the firms’ anticipated peak demand in the SFE model. Market design and
market rules should take these two parameters into account.
Finally, using a refinement of the model it has been demonstrated that an accurate
temperature forecast can reduce significantly the prediction error of the electricity prices.
Keywords: Electricity Prices, Deregulated Electricity Markets, Electricity Price Variance,
Cournot Model, Bertrand Model, Supply Function Equilibrium, Rudkevich and Duck-
worth and Rosen’s Formula, Stochastic Load, Hourly Prices, Average Prices, Edge-
worth Expansion, Method of Cumulants, Volatility, Energy Risk Management, Electricity
Derivatives Prices, Value-at-Risk, Conditional Value-at-Risk.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation describes an engineering approach to a challenging economic problem re-
lated to electricity prices. Deregulating electricity markets is still in early stages. Conse-
quently, markets are not yet mature enough and their behavior is not easily understood.
The recently exhibited extreme volatility of prices provides an impetus for understanding
the pricing process in order to be able to predict electricity prices more accurately. Obtaining
estimates of the expected values of electricity prices is not sufficient for this purpose. At a
minimum, estimates of the variances of prices are also necessary.
1.1 MOTIVATION
Many countries are in the process of restructuring and deregulating their electric power in-
dustry in order to introduce competition into the production markets. Electricity production
was long considered a natural monopoly. However, decade-long experiments carried out by
a number of countries as well as by some regions in the United States have shown that
competition is quite feasible. According to economic theory, competition provides consumer
benefits: low prices, reliable services, predictable bills and future value-added services. In
short, competition offers efficiency which means that the right amount of electricity is pro-
duced by the cheapest generators and consumed by those customers who value it most. In
deregulated markets electricity prices are set by the market itself for every hour. Since the
1
deregulation process started, wholesale electricity prices have however shown a great amount
of variability.
This variability is extreme compared with other markets. Some examples of volatilities1
for daily prices follow (see Weron [88]):
• treasury bills and notes have a volatility of less than 0.5%
• stock indices have a moderate volatility of about 1-1.5%
• commodities like crude oil or natural gas have volatilities of 1.5-4%
• very volatile stocks have volatilities not exceeding 4%
• 2000 Nord Pool electricity price volatility was 11%
• 2000 California/Oregon Border(COB) electricity price volatility was 15%
• 2000 Cinergy electricity price volatility was 37%.
On one hand, large variability can be expected because of the special features of electric-
ity: it cannot be stored, it has to be produced whenever it is needed, demand is stochastic,
there are many physical limitations to production and transmission. On the other hand, the
relative immaturity of the electricity markets also helps contribute to the variability. It is
expected that the effect of the second factor may be reduced (and in fact it has been) as
time passes by and people who influence markets learn from experience.
This variability brings uncertainty to the price. The exposure to uncertainty, that is
when some expected result is affected by an unknown event, is called risk. As in other
more mature markets, the presence of risk gives rise to a derivatives market emerging for
the purpose of hedging risk. This is also the case in electricity markets. A sound derivative
valuation is needed in order to make these markets work properly. The market value of a
derivative is closely related to the volatility of spot prices.
A derivatives market is not self standing. It is closely linked to the spot market. They
influence each other. Spot prices are affected by the existence of derivatives markets.
1Volatility is defined as the yearly normalized standard deviation of price returns. Price return is defined
as the difference between prices over a period divided by the price at the beginning of the period.
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The operating policies and strategic decisions of competing firms, under deregulation,
are such that these tend to maximize profits. In order to do this, however, it is necessary to
be able to predict prices. When predicting price one is interested in at least two important
quantities: the expected value, that is the price one expects to see in the future, and the
prediction error, that is how inaccurate the estimation may be.
Batlle [9] has classified the existing literature on electricity price models into three wide
groups according to the methods they use: game2 theory3 models, time series models, and
production cost models. To date it seems that no work has attempted to combine these
models to get the best from each one in order to form a more comprehensive and complete
model.
Game theory models have been used extensively. Their main advantage is capturing
the bidding process but with no consideration of the complicated engineering production
process.
Time series models are the most common because there are many well-known tools
that can be used to analyze the historical data. But they ignore both the bidding and
the engineering components of the pricing process. They are based on historical data from
which a model is extracted, calibrated and validated. They lack the flexibility of adapting
to structural changes like technology upgrades, increase in the number of competing firms
and new rules. Any change requires a new model, or at least new parameters that need to
be re-calibrated.
Production cost models are abundant in the literature about power markets because they
were useful before the deregulation trend had started. In regulated markets, while the price
is fixed, the firms want to predict cost. Cost is one of the ingredients of electricity price
but not the only one. These models try to capture the engineering process but they do not
portray the bidding behavior of competing firms.
2A game is defined as a set of players who must independently choose among a set of strategies to optimize
their individual payoff functions.
3Game theory is a combined branch of economics and mathematics that study the economic behavior.
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Under the important assumption of symmetric markets (i.e. firms are identical) and
without considering transmission constraints, this work attempts to develop a bottom-up
stochastic model for electricity prices based both on game theory and production cost models.
This model is used to get closed form expressions for the expected values and variances of
hourly prices and average prices in the real-time (spot) market.
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS WORK
From a theoretical point of view, this work is perhaps a first attempt to compute the variance
of electricity prices in deregulated markets using a bid-and-process-based stochastic model.
The model itself is the main contribution of this work. It is flexible and adaptable to
different supply systems, by calibrating the significant parameters. The conclusions are data
depending.
It integrates the physical and engineering processes and the bidding strategies to define
the price as a stochastic process. A supply model and a demand model capture the engi-
neering process. Three different bidding behaviors are considered: Bertrand, Cournot and
Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE). For each, the outcome is an expression of the hourly
price as a function of stochastic variables, related to demand and supply, whose probability
distributions can be ascertained. Thus the probability distribution of hourly prices can be
obtained. The first two models (supply and demand) and the last three models constitute
the warp and woof of the pricing process.
Under some assumptions, closed form expressions for the variance of both hourly real-
time prices and daily average prices are found. The statistics of hourly real-time prices are
useful from a very short-term perspective in order to ascertain the opportunity for offering
energy from a specific unit, or deciding the supply bid function, or withdrawing a unit to do
maintenance. The daily average price is useful for a longer term outlook, to make decisions
about investments and to forecast profitability.
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From a practical point of view, this work may help answer some of the following questions
that market participants may have:
• How can a generation company forecast prices to make its production plan? Which
electricity generating units will be called upon to produce on a given day? In order to
carry out the maintenance plan or substitute some units it will be useful to know the
variance of the merit-order index of the marginal unit.
• Will prices be attractive enough to promote investments so as to supply enough energy
in the future? A competitive market must be capable of growing at the same pace as
demand.
• What will the company’s cash-flow be in a given period? Revenues depend on prices and
on the amount of energy sold. In the computation of forecasted cash-flow the variance
of prices has an important role.
• What is the financial risk level for a new firm entering the market? How can one hedge
that risk? What will be the hedging cost? To cope with the volatility of prices financial
markets have developed derivatives to hedge the risk. The design of the derivatives, and
their costs, are mainly based on the variance of prices.
• How does the number of firms affect the mean and variance of price?
• What is the effect of price elasticity of demand4 on price variability? Electricity demand
elasticity is zero or very close to it because, in most of the markets where deregulation
is in place, it is only the wholesale market that is subject to it, keeping a regulated price
for end consumers. That means that the demand side is not sensitive to the variation in
the wholesale price of electricity in the short run.
1.2.1 Approach
This is a bottom-up or process-based approach, which means that the models try to capture
and integrate the dynamics of the generation process and the bidding process as well. This
4Price elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in quantity as a reaction to 1% change in
price.
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bottom-up approach should provide more accurate information than a statistical analysis of
historical data because the composition of the participating generators in a given market
will be ever-changing in number and technology. It also differs from a top-down perspective
in which economic factors play the most important role.
The stochastic model proposed in this dissertation captures the uncertainty of both the
load and the availability of the units. Due to the bidding rules prices depend heavily on the
generation cost structure of the system and on the magnitude of hourly load. This aspect
is crucial under deregulation, especially because the electricity prices have recently shown a
large variation. Electricity companies need to make decisions under uncertainty. The more
knowledge the participants have on the probability distribution of prices, the better off they
will be to compete.
Few models combine a process-based fundamental as well as stochastic approach, and at
the same time take into account the market equilibrium. None of the existing models has
addressed directly the topic of variance of electricity prices. See subsection 4.1.4.
The model presented in this work improves other models in the following respects:
• it uses a more realistic modeling of supply curves,
• it includes the effect of ambient temperature on the load,
• it considers forced outages of generation units,
• it takes into account the market structure (number of firms, installed capacity and mar-
ginal cost),
• it is based on market equilibrium.
Game theory plays an important role in this work. The market equilibrium mentioned
above proceeds from well known studies on oligopolistic games. Assumptions about the
firms’ behavior and knowledge of the market are made following standards of game theory.
This approach integrates the engineering aspects with the economic ones. There are
many valuable papers in Economics studying the electricity markets under deregulation (see
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sections 4.2 and 4.3 below). It is a hot and current topic, perhaps because deregulation
processes have recently started in many countries and they have shown signs of oligopolistic
behavior. But they do not take into account the underlying engineering processes. In general
they are theoretical studies on the market equilibrium. On the other hand, there are also
some important research work on electricity production-cost based pricing models but they
do not consider the bidding aspects of the process (see section 4.1.2 below).
1.2.2 Research objective
The objective here is to study the variance of the hourly real-time (spot) generation price,
using a fundamental model, that includes physical (engineering) and economic aspects. It
will study the propagation of uncertainty from demand and from the availability of generating
units to the wholesale hourly electricity price, considering three economic models. It will also
produce a closed form expression for the variance of the daily average real-time generation
price. Finally a stochastic model will be used to look at the extent to which the error in
predicted prices is reduced if an accurate temperature forecast is available.
1.2.3 Assumptions and limitations
The way that electricity prices are cleared in a deregulated market is extremely complex.
Many factors intervene in the process:
• market rules (bidding patterns, schedule, cap price, derivatives),
• market structure (number and size of the firms, market power),
• demand elasticity,
• transmission infrastructure,
• reliability regulations (capacity reserve, ancillary services),
• fuel cost,
• unit commitment,
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• forced outages,
• level of demand.
This work provides a simplified model in order to obtain several preliminary conclusions.
The assumptions for this work are as follows.
In real power markets there are large generating companies which actually influence the
wholesale electricity price, and there are many other small firms which are price-takers and
constitute a fringe in the power market. These last ones usually do not own the marginal
unit. The model only considers the large ones as competing firms. The model goes a step
further and assumes that the competing firms are symmetric. This assumption is far removed
from the real world but it is frequently made and needed for tractability purposes.
Transmission failures and transmission congestion are not included in the model because
transmission is not a binding issue in the majority of situations (locations and hours). Fuel
costs are random variables but the model assumes them to be deterministic because they do
not change much in the short term.
1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK
The first three chapters introduce the electricity markets. Chapter 2 explains the characteris-
tics of the power markets and the on-going deregulation trend. Chapter 3 covers fundamental
aspects of risk management and how this study may provide a tool for formulating this im-
portant topic in the context of a young derivative market for electricity. Chapter 4 describes
the basic economic theory for electricity prices and provides justification for the choice of
the models used in this work.
Chapters 5 and 6 are the core of the analysis and develop the formulas for the expected
value and variance of hourly price and the average daily price respectively. Chapter 7 gives
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numerical examples for the results obtained in chapters 5 and 6 using illustrative supply and
demand models. A code written in Matlab is used to run the model.
Chapter 8 depicts a stochastic model of the load and considers the use of ambient temper-
ature to forecast load more accurately. The objective is to show the extent of reduction in the
error of the predicted prices. Finally, chapter 9 states the conclusions and recommendations
for future work.
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2.0 ELECTRICITY MARKETS
Electricity is a very peculiar commodity both from engineering and economic perspectives.
There is no other commodity or product with similar characteristics. In order to understand
the economic problem it is necessary to know how the markets operate and the underlying
economic concepts. At the same time, it is important to get acquainted with the engineering
aspects of electricity generation. Both topics are closely interlinked.
This chapter describes the characteristics of electricity markets that make them special
and how they affect the pricing process. It also explains the deregulation trend in many
countries and how this influences prices. Several different types of electricity markets are
described. By the end of the chapter the object under study of this work is clearly defined.
2.1 WHY ARE ELECTRICITY MARKETS DIFFERENT?
2.1.1 The physics behind electricity
Electricity is not storable —at least it is not efficiently storable in great quantities. Its
demand must always be met in real time. Many exogenous events can influence both demand
and supply. Climatic events like high ambient temperature can change demand dramatically.
A thunderstorm can damage transmission lines and consequently curtail supply. Unit outages
and line congestion give rise to uncertainty of supply.
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Another important aspect that needs to be brought into consideration is transmission
congestion. Electricity follows physical transmission rules like:
• Electricity takes the path of least resistance.
• The transmission of power over the network is subject to a complex series of physical
interactions (e.g., Kirchhoff’s laws1).
• Electricity travels at the speed of light.
As a consequence, some paths may get congested putting at risk the security of infrastruc-
ture. Congestion may make it necessary to use more expensive units to supply energy to a
specific place. The speed of transmission requires a permanent control over the system to
avoid shortages or dangerous deviations (frequency, voltage). The time available to react
with a corrective action is very short.
2.1.2 Strategic analysis of the electricity industry
Michael Porter’s Five Forces model (Porter [58]) for industry analysis helps us to understand
the electricity industry. The model assumes that a company is driven by five forces. In par-
ticular the price is affected by them. These forces are: level of rivalry, threats of substitutes,
buyers’ power, suppliers’ power and barriers to entry (or, to the contrary, threats of entry).
Level of rivalry.
The experience on competition in commodity markets is vast and widespread. Under
perfect competition2 it is well known that price equals marginal cost3. But the electricity
1First Law: The current flow into any node in a circuit equals the current flow out.
Second Law: The voltage drops around any loop add up to zero.
2The market is under perfect competition when agents act competitively, have well-behaved costs and
good information, and free entry brings the economic profit level to zero. To act competitively is to take
the market price as given (agents are price takers). Well-behaved costs imply that short-run marginal cost
increases with output and the average cost of production stops decreasing when a supplier’s size reaches a
moderate level. Good information means that market prices are publicly available. Free entry ensures that
competitors are able to enter the market freely. Stoft [74], 1-5.2
3Marginal cost is defined as the cost of producing the last unit of output, or the cost of producing one
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markets around the world which have already been deregulated are far from being a perfect
market. In the transition from regulated monopolies towards deregulation, power markets
show different levels of oligopoly4 in which some evidence of market power5 has been found.
The special characteristics of the electricity market enumerated above make it relatively
easy for generators to exercise market power as compared to producers of other goods. The
market design (number and relative size of competing firms, auction type to clear the price)
obviously influences the degree of rivalry too.
Threats of substitutes.
Electricity cannot be easily substituted, especially in the short term. Research is being
conducted since long ago on substitutes for the main perishable sources of energy to produce
electricity: coal, fuel and gas. But there is nothing competing with electricity.
Buyers’ power.
Another characteristic of the electricity market is the very low price-elasticity of demand
at least during certain hours. This means that a variation in price has almost no influence
on the quantity to be sold. One explanation for this is that in most countries deregulation
takes place in the wholesale market, whereas the retail market is still regulated. As a result
the end user cannot react to the wholesale price and therefore cannot contribute to demand
elasticity.
Suppliers’ power.
Suppliers to the power generating companies are those that provide the “raw materials”
which are also commodities in the majority of cases (coal, fuel, gas). The suppliers are
scattered and have very little negotiating power. In other cases, nature is the supplier
(hydro, wind).
more unit of output. Often, these two costs coincide.
4An oligopoly is a market dominated by a few sellers. Each of them can affect the market but does not
control it. Each producer must consider the effect of a price change on the actions of the other producers.
5Market power is defined as the ability of a seller to reduce the output supplied to the market so as to
raise the market price, and to do so profitably [Hunt [38], Glossary].
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Barriers to entry.
Generating units are capital intensive which constitutes an entry barrier for new com-
petitors to the market. And access to the grid is needed. The procedure to supply power
to the grid also requires supervision on technical characteristics (voltage, frequency and
synchronization).
As a result of all these facts, which are very difficult to change in the short term, electricity
prices are very much dependent on the market design.
2.2 DEREGULATION TREND
Restructuring, competition and deregulation of power markets began less than two decades
ago6. Power markets around the world are wending their way towards deregulation. The
path is not easy. They are following the experience of the telecommunications and gas
industries but they are finding different challenges along the way.
Most of the OECD7 countries have reformed their power generation markets opening
them up to free competition. This is already the case in Finland, Germany, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, England and Wales in the UK and several states in the USA and Australia.
In a few years they plan to open them up completely to include even the retail market. By
the year 2006, more than 500 million people (and all large industrial users) in the OECD
area will be able to choose their electricity supplier. This accounts for nearly 50% of the
population of OECD countries.8 Table 2.1 shows the global explosion of deregulation.
In the United States of America the situation is very different from state to state. There
are three Independent System Operators (ISOs)9 in the Northeast: PJM, New York and
6UK started the process in 1988; USA in 1992.
7Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
8cfr. International Energy Agency [40].
9System operator independent from control by any single market participant or group of participants.
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Table 2.1: Deregulation by countries
Country Year Operator’s Name
UK 1990 England & Wales Electricity Pool
Chile 1990 Centro de Despacho Econo´mico de Carga
Argentina 1992 Mercado Ele´ctrico Mayorista (MEM)
Norway 1992 Nord Pool
Colombia 1995 Bolsa de Energ´ıa de Colombia
Sweden 1996 Nord Pool
New Zealand 1996 New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM)
Australia 1998 National Electricity Market (NEM)
Spain 1998 Operadora del Mercado Espan˜ol de Electricidad (OMEL)
Finland 1998 Nord Pool
US 1998 California Power Exchange (CalPX)
Netherlands 1999 Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX)
US 1999 New York ISO (NYISO)
Germany 2000 Leipzig Power Exchange (LPX)
Germany 2000 European Energy Exchange (EEX)
Denmark 2000 Nord Pool
Poland 2000 Towarowa Gielda Energii (Polish Power Exchange, PolPX)
US 2000 Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Interconnection
UK 2001 UK Power Exchange (UKPX)
UK 2001 Automated Power Exchange (APX UK)
Slovenia 2001 Borzen
Poland 2002 Platforma Obrotu Energia¸ Electryczna¸ (POEE)
France 2002 Powernext
Austria 2002 Energy Exchange Austria (EXAA)
US 2003 ISO New England
Italy 2004 Italian Power Exchange (IPEX)
Czech Republic 2004 Opera´tor Trhu s Elektrˇinou (OTE)
US 2005 Midwest ISO (MISO)
Belgium 2006 Belgian Power Exchange (Belpex)
(Sources: Weron [88], and others)
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New England which have full retail access10 . California and Texas have their own ISOs.
California has full retail access, but Texas does not —it is in process. Other states (Arizona,
Ohio, Montana, Illinois, Michigan and Virginia) have begun reforms too but they do not
have wholesale market institutions in place yet.11
At the inception of the deregulatory trend it was believed that an open market would
behave as one in which perfect competition prevails. This has not been the case with the
deregulated power markets. Rather their behavior has been closer to that of an oligopoly.
The goal of having a deregulated market is to improve efficiency on both the supply
and the demand sides. Competition provides much stronger cost-minimizing incentives than
regulated environments; it stimulates the creativity of suppliers to develop new energy-
saving technologies and to make sounder investments. On the demand side it promotes
energy conservation and ensures that electricity is consumed by the users who value it most.
The means to achieve efficiency through competition are open access, restructuring and
deregulation. Every producer should have open access to transmission lines which means
equal opportunity to sell the energy. Restructuring includes different actions to change
existing companies: incorporation, privatizing, divesting. Deregulation means ceasing to
regulate but not only by removing controls on prices and on the entry of competing suppliers
but also creating the right environment for competition. Supportive market conditions must
also be put into place to achieve efficiency.12
Deregulation also aims at stimulating investment. Electricity demand is growing at a
rate of 2.7 % in the world, and 2.5 % in the USA (Figure 2.1)13. In order to be able to
produce and deliver energy at the same growth rate, one needs to account for the fact that
the installation of base load generation and transmission facilities requires a great deal of
time.
Hunt [38], Glossary
10Retail access is the ability of different energy providers (retailers) to compete in the electricity market
to sell residential, commercial or industrial customers power at unregulated rates. Hunt [38], Glossary
11cfr. Hunt [38], 273–277.
12cfr. Hunt [38], 5–8.
13Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/iea/table62.html
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Figure 2.1: Total electricity consumption 1991 – 2000
2.3 THE ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM
This section explains how the production, transmission and distribution of electrical energy
occur. The knowledge of the engineering of electricity generation is necessary to understand
the pricing process. As discussed earlier, electricity has special characteristics that deeply
affect the market price.
Energy is produced by many different units that generate power from thermal, nuclear,
hydro or wind energy. The specifications, performance, cost and capacity of these units are
very different. The cheapest ones like nuclear, coal-fired and hydro units work continually
satisfying the base load demand. For the load peaks, the more expensive generator units
are called on to work in a merit order (based on respective price in order from cheapest to
most expensive) as consumers demand more energy. Each unit has some technical aspects to
deal with when they are called on to serve or to end serving. They require a period of time
to start up and a period of time to shut down. This conditions the dispatching of units to
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serve. It may be more convenient to keep a specific unit running instead of shutting it down
for a short time; or to start up a more expensive unit for a short time because a cheaper one
requires more time to start up, for example.
The cost of producing energy may be broken down into two main types: fixed and
variable costs. Fixed costs are those that do not depend on the amount of energy produced:
start-up, shut-down, maintenance and depreciation costs. Variable costs , on the contrary,
are proportional to the energy generated.
As demand needs to be met at every moment more units are called on to produce energy
at the pace it is needed. All the properties mentioned above are relevant to decide which
units will be called in and out, when, for how long, and the amount of energy to be produced
by each. When electricity production was a monopoly or was regulated (or where it is still
so), these decisions were taken in a centralized way, solving the so-called unit commitment
problem together with the economic dispatch problem. There are many models and attempts
to solve this very complex combinatorial optimization problem that have many variables and
constraints and a non-linear objective function. The objective of the optimization problem
is to minimize overall cost.
Under deregulation, the unit commitment problem still exists but its character has
changed radically. First, there is no single omniscient decision- maker but many agents
involved in the process with partial information. Second, the new objective function for each
competitor is maximizing profits, not minimizing costs. So a new and very relevant variable
comes into play: electricity price. Third, considering the characteristics of energy, especially
the need to meet demand at every moment, another institution must take on an important
role: the Independent System Operator (ISO). It is in charge of clearing the market spot
price, scheduling the units and monitoring the system to meet demand continuously.
A power transmission system is sometimes referred to as a power grid. The arcs are
wires and the nodes are either energy suppliers or consumers. Redundant paths and lines
are provided so that power can be routed from any power plant to any load center, along a
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Figure 2.2: Electricity marketplace
variety of routes, based on the economics of the transmission path and the cost of power.
A first level of the grid is the generation level (25 kV). As soon as electricity is produced
it is transformed into high voltage electricity (above 110 kV and up to 770 kV) to reduce
energy losses in the transmission process over long distances through high-voltage lines.
Transmission consists of delivering electricity from the power generation plants to large
consumer points like cities or industrial parks. Once there, electricity voltage must be
reduced for distribution purposes in the area to less than 50 kV. This voltage reduction
is done in consecutive steps in stations, substations and small transformers at the city,
neighborhood or block level, until the end consumer voltage (110 V or 220 V) is reached.
The last step of the delivery of energy is retailing which consists of managing the connection,
disconnection and billing of electricity consumers. See figure 2.2.
The market existing between generating companies and distribution companies, retailers
or large consumers is called the wholesale marketplace. Delivery is made along transmission
wires. Transmission companies usually neither buy nor sell energy, but charge a fee for trans-
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mitting electricity from one node to another. The marketplace existing between distribution
companies/retailers and end users is called the retail marketplace. Electricity is delivered
via distribution wires.
Electricity transmission and distribution are natural monopolies. Traditionally genera-
tion was also a monopoly everywhere. Although in many countries it is still so, in some
others the generation industry has been opened up to different competing actors creating a
wholesale market, a global trend that started in 1988 in the UK (see table 2.1). In some
countries, retailing activity has also been opened up to a free market following the wholesale
market trend, providing the opportunity for end consumers to select from different energy
retail suppliers. This is known as “retail access” or “customer choice”. This is the case of
UK, New Zealand, Australia, Argentina, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Alberta and many states
of the United States 14. But in most other countries the retail price is still regulated. In all
cases there are some intermediate actors that buy electricity at a spot price and sell it at
fixed rates, who have to absorb the volatilities of the spot prices without being able to pass
it on to their customers.
2.4 WHOLESALE POWER MARKETS
The challenge facing countries seeking deregulation, is how to design the new electricity
markets (the number and size of participants and rules) such that the decisions made by
the profit-maximizing independent companies contribute to an efficient market performance,
reliable power supply and cheap prices. The first deregulated market was the England and
Wales Electric Pool. Many others around the world followed. Each newcomer was looking
at the experiences of the existing ones. Some of them subsequently needed to be reformed.
This is the case with the England and Wales Electric Pool, which in 2001 adopted the New
Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA), substituting the old Pool Rules. The California
14See Hunt [38], chapter 3.
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Power Exchange (CalPX) suspended trading on its markets in January 2001. In 2002, a new
design started up, operated by the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). For
details on market design Zhou, Grasso, and Niu [93] have given a very good review.
Deregulated electricity markets differ from one region or country to another in many
ways: number and size of the competing firms, bidding rules and existence of different types
of price. The following subsections present some market mechanisms.
2.4.1 Bilateral and mediated markets
There are two basic market types: bilateral markets and mediated markets. In bilateral
markets buyers and sellers trade directly (or through brokers). In mediated markets there
exists an intermediary who buys from the supplier and sells to the end-consumer. The most
rudimentary type of mediated market is a dealer market. A dealer buys and sells at his own
risk. There exist more organized forms of mediated markets — namely, exchanges and pools.
2.4.2 Exchange and pool
An exchange is a mediated, centralized market and provides security for traders. It is less
flexible than a bilateral market because traders must follow specific rules. It utilizes auctions
that give transparency to the market and constitutes a traditional method of competitive
market implementation. It uses simple (one-part) bids: energy quantity and its price. Due
to the lack of flexibility it can operate much cheaper, faster and closer to real-time than a
bilateral market. But marginal cost is not the only cost that generating firms have. There
are also start-up costs, no-load costs and ancillary services15 among others. The drawback
of an exchange is that a simple bid cannot capture this complexity.
15Those services are required to deliver electricity to end-users at stable frequencies and voltages; they
include frequency regulation or control, spinning reserves, non-spinning reserves, and reactive supply/voltage
control. (Hunt [38], Glossary)
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A pool is also a mediated auction market characterized by the existence of side payments
such as ancillary services and no-load costs. The side payments are useful to make up for
costs other than marginal costs. Pools utilize complex bids (at least two-part bids): energy
quantity and price, and other side items. Complex bids represent real costs better.
2.4.3 Pay-as-bid and marginal bid pricing
There are two main pricing methods: pay-as-bid and marginal bid pricing. In pay-as-bid
pricing all the generators that bid less than the clearing price will operate and be paid as
they bid. On the other hand, marginal bid pricing will pay the same clearing price to all the
generators that run. The latter is the most widely-used methodology in deregulated power
markets.
2.4.4 Day-ahead and real-time markets
Usually power markets are two-settlement systems . This means that the system operator
runs two energy markets: a day-ahead market and a real-time (spot) market. The day-ahead
market is essentially a forward contract market. It operates a day in advance of the real-time
market. Transactions in the day-ahead market are cleared against real-time spot prices in
the following way.
Suppose a day-ahead transaction for quantity Qc is at strike price K. Later on the real-
time transaction is for quantity Qa and the spot price is ST . In this case the supplier will
be paid and the consumer will be charged the amount:
QcK + (Qa −Qc)ST
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2.4.5 PJM market
PJM is a marginal bid pricing pool that operates a day-ahead energy market and a real-time
energy market, besides other markets like ancillary services and capacity. The day-ahead
energy market is a forward market in which day-ahead locational marginal prices (LMPs) 16
are calculated for each hour of the next operating day based on generation offers, demand
bids and bilateral transactions submitted to it. The real-time energy market is based on
current day operations in which real-time locational marginal prices (LMPs) are calculated
at five-minute intervals based on the actual system operating conditions. Technically PJM
refers to demand bids as bids and to supply offers as offers. Figure 2.317 describes the PJM
day-ahead market.
The day-ahead market matches supply with demand. The market is voluntary for the
demand side. That is the buyers do not need to submit bids. Even if the load bid into the
market is less than the PJM load forecast, PJM will commit units up to the forecast.
The re-bidding period, also called reliability run, is only for generation that was not
selected in the day-ahead market when the results were posted at 4 pm. Generators that
were not accepted in the day-ahead market are given an opportunity to re-bid if they like
to. This changed bid is also the bid that will be carried into the real-time, should this unit
be needed for energy. Loads cannot re-bid.
In the real-time market there is no call for new bids. Generators offered in the day-ahead
market and in the re-bidding period carry through to the real-time market. Loads pay spot
price if they need to purchase their energy from real-time markets. Real-time prices are
calculated using the real-time flow of energy with the generation offers from the day-ahead
market acting as a foundation.
16LMP are defined as the cost to serve the next MWh at a specific location. See page 26 for more details.
17Sources: PJM Training, PJM 101: The Basics: http://www.pjm.com/
22
Figure 2.3: PJM Day-ahead Market Time Line
2.5 PRICING ENERGY
Over the past few years, deregulated electricity markets have gained a lot of experience
regarding electricity prices and market configuration. They have succeeded in coordinating
the daily system operations but the level and volatility of electricity prices have been far
above expectations. There are two chapters on this topic in Ilic, Galiana, and Finck’s Power
Systems Restructuring. Engineering and Economics [39] from which I extract the main ideas
of this section: Chapter 4 (by Green [31]) and Chapter 7 (by Graves, Read, Hanser, and
Earle [29]).
Price spikes have been a problem since the beginning of regulation but, as time passes
by, electricity markets have been able to reduce price spikes considerably. Figure 2.418
shows the average hourly locational marginal price during the period July-August 1999 in
the PJM zone. There were many price spikes. But they have been dying down until 2004.
18Source: PJM, Energy Prices, 1999 LMP Duration Data & Graphs : http://www.pjm.com/
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Figure 2.4: Electricity prices for July-August, 1999 (PJM market)
Nevertheless, in 2005 there were again many hours in which the PJM system price was above
the $ 150 benchmark. Among other reasons this is due to significant increases in fuel cost for
the marginal units and in load, geographic expansion of the PJM zone and a hotter summer.
See table 2.2.
One tool used to cope with the volatility of prices is the existence of active and competi-
tive forward markets such as the day-ahead market. It allows customers to insure themselves
against price spikes. From the investor’s point of view, forward contracting helps to mitigate
the risks of building and maintaining new peaking capacity that may have only rare but
significantly profitable use.19
As seen in subsection 2.4.2, there are two main pricing systems: a) one-part markets
reflecting both marginal operating costs and capacity scarcity; and b) two-part markets
having separate energy and capacity markets. Electricity Pool of England and Wales (UK)
is an example of the first model and PJM Interconnection (USA) is an example of the second.
19See Graves, Read, Hanser, and Earle [29].
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Table 2.2: Price spikes
Hours with LMP above
Year $ 900 $ 700 $ 200 $ 150 Maximum price
1999 33 48 N/A 91 $ 999
2001 10 13 N/A 60 greater than $ 900
2002 1 N/A 20 less than $ 800
2003 1 11 $ 211
2004 5 $ 180
2005 35 234 N/A
(Source: PJM State of the Market 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 [56])
One-part markets tend to be more volatile than two-part markets. In the British power pool,
since privatization (in 1990) and up to 1997, price has not risen significantly but volatility
has risen dramatically.20
2.5.1 A one-part electricity market
Electricity Pool of England and Wales (the UK Pool) is a one-part market in which there
is only one payment, without side payments. It defines two prices: the Pool Purchase Price
(PPP) and the Pool Selling Price (PSP).
There are three components involved: the System Marginal Price (SMP), the Capacity
Payment and a residual Uplift. PPP is the price (£/MWh) awarded by the Pool for electricity
generated by generators and purchased at Grid Supply Points (GSPs). It is the sum of
SMP plus the Capacity Payment. PSP is the price (£/MWh) which suppliers pay for their
electricity, sold at Grid Supply Points (GSPs). It is the sum of PPP plus the residual Uplift.
The Uplift is the difference between PSP and PPP covering reserve, constrained running,
20See Graves, Read, Hanser, and Earle [29].
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forecasting errors, ancillary services and marginal plant adjustments. The Uplift is intended
to recover costs not met by SMP.
The SMP is the basis for pricing. Between 1990/1 and 1995/6, SMP accounted for 85%
of the demand-weighted Pool Selling Price (PSP). It is the marginal price of electricity,
established day-ahead in the Unconstrained Schedule21 through a matching of supply- and
demand-side price and quantity bids in the wholesale market, settled every half-hour. SMP is
equal to the average cost per MWh of the marginal generating unit. It includes incremental
price (i.e., the actual marginal cost), start-up and no-load costs. No-load cost is the cost of
running the unit unloaded.
Marginal unit price = Incremental price +
no-load cost × duration + start-up cost
total output
Capacity Payment is a component that encourages the reserve of capacity to prevent
outages. Every MW of capacity which is declared available in a half-hour receives a capacity
payment for that half-hour whether or not it is scheduled to be generated. It reflects the
cost to society of an outage. This depends on the Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) 22 and
the Value of Lost Load (VOLL)23. LOLP is calculated by the UK Pool to measure the risk
of a power cut while the VOLL is set by the British government.24
Capacity Payment = LOLP × (V OLL− SMP )
2.5.2 A two-part electricity market
PJM is a two-part market because it uses one price for electricity and one price for other
services (ancillary services, capacity). It defines locational marginal price (LMP) as the cost
to serve the next MWh at a specific location using the lowest price of all available generation
21The half hour by half hour schedule of generating units notionally required to meet forecast demand and
reserve, which is produced the day ahead of trading, ignoring transmission constraints.
22Loss of Load Probability is the probability that the electricity system will have a service interruption
due to a lack of generating capacity. (Hunt [38], Glossary)
23Value of Lost Load is the cost to end-use customers if power is cut off. (Hunt [38], Glossary)
24Sources: Green [31] and The Electricity Pool web site: www.elecpool.com
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while observing all transmission limits. In other words, the marginal cost to provide energy
at a specific location depends on marginal cost to operate generation, total load (demand)
and cost of delivery on transmission system. Its components are:
LMP = Generation Marginal Cost + Transmission Congestion Costs
+ Cost of Marginal Losses
LMPs are equal when the transmission system is unconstrained (ignoring loss compo-
nent), and they vary by location when the transmission system is constrained. Generators
get paid at generation bus LMP. Loads pay at load bus LMP. LMPs are settled every hour.
(Source: PJM web site [56])
2.5.3 Congestion management
Electricity travels through a complex wired grid following the laws of physics. There is no
way to control the path of electricity. If flow is larger than the line capacity the line will be
overloaded. The only thing that can be done to prevent overloading a line is by asking some
generators to produce less and others to produce more.
When the flow through a line (or many) reaches its transmission capacity a congestion
event is said to have occurred. Congestion management is the process of managing the use of
the transmission system so [that] transmission capacity constraints are not violated (Hunt
[38], Glossary).
Congestion management is one of the toughest problems in electricity market design
(Stoft [74], Section 1-2.2). There are many ways to handle this problem. The most efficient
one is nodal pricing adopted by PJM, New York and New England ISOs. The following quote
comes from 2004 PJM State of the Market [57]:
Congestion occurs when available, low-cost energy cannot be delivered to all loads as a result
of limited transmission facilities. When the least cost available energy cannot be delivered
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to load in a transmission-constrained area, higher cost units in that area must be dispatched
to meet the load.25 The result is that the price of energy in the constrained area is higher
than elsewhere and congestion exists. Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) reflect the cost
of the lowest cost resources available to meet loads, taking into account the actual delivery
constraints imposed by the transmission system. Thus LMP is an efficient way of pricing
energy supply when transmission constraints exist. Congestion reflects this efficient pricing.
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As the 2004 PJM State of the Market [57] shows in Section 6, Local Congestion (Figures
6-9 through 6-36), the congestion component of the LMP is very small: around 1% of the
annual average LMP.
2.5.4 Market power and market concentration
In an oligopoly, price can be manipulated by a number of large companies exercising what
is called market power. Market power can generally be defined as the ability of a particular
seller, or group of sellers, to influence the prices of a product to their advantage over a
sustained period of time.
There are two indices to measure the extent of market power. The Lerner Index (LI) and
the Price-Cost Margin Index (PCMI) defined as follows. Both measure the degree to which
the actual price of a product in a market deviates from the perfectly competitive price. The
LI considers the deviation over the actual price, while the PCMI does so over the perfectly
competitive price27. The definitions are:
LI =
Actual Price − Perfectly Competitive Price
Actual Price
× 100% (2.1)
PCMI =
Actual Price − Perfectly Competitive Price
Perfectly Competitive Price
× 100% (2.2)
25This is referred to as dispatching out of merit order. Merit order is the order of all generator offers from
lowest to highest cost. Congestion occurs when loadings on transmission facilities mean that the next unit
in merit order cannot be used and that a higher cost unit must be used in its place
262004 PJM State of the Market [57], Section 6
27The Perfectly Competitive Price is equal to the marginal cost of electricity generation.The US Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) merger guidelines state that a market can be considered competitive if PCMI is below
5%.
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The PCMI and the LI are connected in the following way:
LI =
PCMI
1 + PCMI
(2.3)
Market concentration refers to what the market share distribution is like in a given
market. It can be measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), which is defined as:
HHI =
∑
S2i (2.4)
where Si is the share of each firm in the market expressed as a percentage. HHI ranges
between a very small number for an extremely atomized market, and 10,000 for a monopoly.
Note that 10,000 divided by HHI yields a number that can be interpreted as the equivalent
number of identical-sized firms in the market.28
Market power and market concentration are obviously correlated. In general, the more
unconcentrated a market, the less market power can be exercised.29
An instrument to mitigate market power is forward markets. They reduce the capability
of dominant firms to manipulate prices in times of scarcity alleviating generation market
concentration concerns. They also encourage greater competition.
2.6 SUMMARY
Electricity prices are very complex and may include different components in different markets
according to the market design. In order to accomplish the objective of this work it is
necessary to make certain assumptions.
28The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) adopted the DOJ/Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
guidelines which state that a market is “unconcentrated” if its HHI is less than 1,000, “moderately con-
centrated” if its HHI lies between 1,000 and 1,800, and “highly concentrated” if its HHI is greater than
1,800.
29See Rudkevich, Duckworth and Rosen [63].
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This analysis considers real-time prices which are intrinsically the stochastic variables
and present a high variability. The prices in this model are cleared in mediated markets
with the marginal-bid pricing method. In a one-part electricity market like the UK Pool, the
object of study is the SMP. In a two-part market like PJM Interconnection, it is the LMP
when the system is unconstrained.
This work does not consider either transmission constraints, or transmission costs or
costs from losses. Since transmission line congestion is not that common, the analysis given
here provides a close approximation to reality. The analysis becomes much more complex if
the transmission constraints and line losses are included in the model.
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3.0 ENERGY RISK MANAGEMENT
Until deregulation started electricity prices were fixed by a regulator. There was no way nor
need to predict prices: uncertainty did not exist. Under deregulation electricity prices became
uncertain. Now prices need to be predicted as accurately as possible. When predicting prices
one has to look for two measures: what she expects to see in the future; and how wrong she
may be, that is how far the actual price in the future might differ from the expected value.
Being exposed to uncertainty implies that somebody may be adversely affected by a
future unknown event. In that case it is said that he or she is facing risk. Risk is exposure
to uncertainty. In recognition of the prevailing uncertainty energy markets have recently
started to be transformed by derivatives and other instruments for risk management1.
This chapter introduces some concepts on risk management and describes the use of
derivatives in energy markets. It shows the strong dependence of the derivatives’ prices in
power markets on the expected value and variance of electricity prices, pointing out the
importance of a deeper study of these quantities. In measuring risk variance of prices also
plays an important role.
Its purpose is not to cover risk management extensively but to suggest several possible
uses for this dissertation’s derivations in this regard. Dragana Pilipovic´, in his Energy Risk.
Valuing and Managing Energy Derivatives [55], deals deeply with risk management in energy
markets.
1The process and tools used for evaluating, measuring and managing the various risks within a company’s
portfolio of financial, commodities and other assets
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3.1 FINANCIAL MARKETS
Derivatives are financial tools to hedge risk. A derivative instrument is called derivative
because its value derives from the value of some other variable (commodity, energy, stock or
any other financial instrument). The latter is called the underlier . The underlier may be a
cash instrument (stocks, commodities, interest rates) which has a value by itself or, in turn,
may be another derivative.
Some derivatives or commodities are traded on established exchanges, like the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), and are called
exchange traded . The role of the exchange is to guarantee or facilitate the agreement settle-
ment.
The derivatives themselves being holder’s rights (and issuer’s liabilities) have some mar-
ket value. It is necessary to value or price a derivative then. This is especially important
when an option2 is issued, since the issuer will want to charge a reasonable price —what is
called the premium— for the option. But after a derivative is issued, it has a market value
which is not constant but depends on expected spot prices and its volatility.
3.1.1 Forward and futures contracts
The simplest hedging tools are forward and futures contracts. Both are derivatives in which
two parties agree on a transaction that will take place some time in the future. It has four
components: i) the underlier, ii) the notional (or contractual) amount, iii) the delivery (or
strike) price and iv) the settlement (or expiration) date on which the transaction will take
place. The difference is that a forward is done directly between two parties (it is referred to
as over-the-counter OTC ) while a futures is settled in an exchange.
2An option is a contract that gives one party the right, but not the obligation, to perform a specified
transaction with another party.
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In energy markets forward and futures are used to hedge the risk of price variation. They
are called Contracts for Difference (CfD). Under a CfD, the buyer (long party) will pay and
the seller (short party) will receive the amount
QcK + (Qa −Qc)ST (3.1)
or, equivalently,
QaST +Qc(K − ST ) (3.2)
where
Qc and K are contract quantity and strike price respectively, and
Qa and ST are actual traded quantity and spot price at the settlement date T .
At settlement, the CfD has a market value for the buyer of
MFT,T = Qc(ST −K) (3.3)
The quantities Qc and K are fixed at the moment of signing the CfD but ST is a random
variable.
Prior to settlement the market value of the forward incorporates the concept of forward
price. Forward and futures prices are directly tied to the spot price: they both are risk-
adjusted and net cost-adjusted expectations of the spot prices at forward points in time. A
graph of forward prices for different maturities is called a forward curve. When a forward
contract is entered the strike price K is set equal to the forward price F0,T seen at time 0
for the settlement date T . That is K = F0,T . Subsection 3.1.3 takes a closer look at forward
prices.
At any time u < T , that is before settlement, the forward market value for the long party
is given by
MFu,T = Qc(Fu,T −K)e−f(T−u) (3.4)
where
f is the risk-free interest rate, and
Fu,T is the forward price at time u for the settlement date T .
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Note that at any time, the market value for the long party is positive if the forward price
is greater than the strike price. Therefore, the forward price is needed for forward valuation.
3.1.2 Volatility
Volatility is a key factor in the behavior of the derivative price process. It depicts the
magnitude of the randomness of the asset price and is used as an important input in the
valuation and risk management of a portfolio3. In option pricing, for example, the width of
the price distribution determines the probability that the option expires in-the-money4 and
how much intrinsic value it has. The wider the distribution, the more value the option has.
Price return is defined as the ratio between the difference between prices over a period
and the price at the beginning of the period:
dSu
Su
=
Su+du
Su
− 1 (3.5)
Volatility σ is defined as the price returns’ standard deviation normalized by time with
time du expressed in years:
σ =
StDev(dSu/Su)√
du
(3.6)
It is also the square root of the variance of price returns in a year. In other words, it is
the square root of the annualized variance of price returns. The relation between volatility
and variance of the spot price is given by
σ =
√
V aru[ST ]
Su
√
(T − u) (3.7)
where
T is the settlement (or expiration) date
Su is the option price at day u
V aru[ST ] is the variance of the option price at the expiration date, seen at day u.
3A collection of assets and financial positions based on such assets.
4An option expires in-the-money, when it has an intrinsic value at the settlement date.
34
There are three different volatilities to measure:
1. Historical volatilities are observed from historical data of spot prices. They provide us
with information about the past.
2. Market-implied volatilities come from the expected price of options in the future. As one
has the actual market option price, he can go backwards from the expected price in the
future and calculate the volatility implied in that option price. This volatility depicts
what the market considers the spot price will be at some point in the future. It gives
information about the future.
3. Model-implied volatilities, as the term suggests, depend on the model in use and its
parameters. Given the models for spot and forward prices, one can estimate the model-
implied volatilities.
This work helps to asses the market-implied volatility, reversing the process. The beliefs
of expected forward prices will not determine the volatility but the other way around: the
volatilities will set the forward prices. This model, in finding the variance of prices, will
provide a tool to compute the volatility through equation 3.7.
3.1.3 The forward price curve
Forward prices are key inputs to any derivatives pricing and risk management calculation.
They are closely related to spot prices, but they differ. Pilipovic´ [55] explains why forward
prices are not —as a rule— equal to the expected spot prices.
Under some assumptions, at any given moment in time u < T , the forward price curve
is
Fu,T = Eu[ST ]e
−λσ(T−u) (3.8)
where
Eu[ST ] is the expected value of the spot price at expiration date T seen at day u,
λ is the market cost of risk defined by λ =
(ν − f)
σ
(see Hull [37]),
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ν is the expected return, continuously compound, and
σ is the implied volatility of the stock price.
The forward price is proportional to the expected stock price and is affected also by the
volatility. This model by determining the expected value and variance may provide the tools
to set the forward prices.
3.2 MEASURING RISK
3.2.1 Value-at-Risk and conditional Value-at-Risk
Volatility is the traditional measure of risk in financial markets. But it fails to point out the
direction of the changes in price.
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a measure of how much an investor can lose in a very bad scenario.
Rather than look only at the expected return and the variance of return, it studies what is
the most an investor can expect to lose —with 95% or 99% level of confidence— in a certain
period (a day, a month, a year). It can be expressed in dollars (or in any other currency) or
as a percentage.
VaR is becoming a very useful tool to measure risk, up to the point of being included
into industry regulations, although technically it is not a risk measure because it does not
fulfill the axiom of sub-additivity5. It looks at the 5% or 1% worst case scenarios of the
profit-and-loss (P&L) probability distribution. For example, if 95% of the cases the profit is
bigger than, say -4%, the VaR is -4% with 95% level of confidence.
Three methods are used to calculate VaR: from historical data, variance-covariance
method and Monte Carlo simulation.
5A function is called a coherent risk measure if it is monotonous, sub-additive, positively homogeneous,
and translation invariant. See Acerbi and Tasche [3] for an explanation of these terms
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1. The historical data method assumes that the future will develop the same way as the
past, from a risk perspective. VaR can be obtained from the worst case scenarios in the past.
2. The variance-covariance method assumes that the returns are normally distributed,
with mean µR and standard deviation σR. This opens the path to use the standard deviation
to assess the 1% or 5% worst case scenarios, using the well known formulas:
µR − 2.33σR for the VaR at 99% level of confidence and
µR − 1.65σR for the VaR at the 95% level of confidence.
3. Monte Carlo simulation involves developing a stochastic model for price and running
it several times. This method allows the analyst to modify parameters that can be expected
to change in the future. After running many trials, once again, the 1% or 5% worst case
scenarios provided the VaR at respective levels of confidence.
Despite its popularity, one of the shortcomings of VaR is that it indicates the minimum
loss attainable in the worst 1% or 5% of the scenarios. But it does not indicate how big the
losses may be. For this reason, Rockafellar and Uryasev [61] [62] presented the conditional
Value-at-Risk (CVaR). This measures the losses that may be in the tail of the probability
distribution. It is defined, at a given confidence level, as the expected loss given that the
loss is greater than or equal to the VaR. Once more, the probability distribution needs to
be known or simulated. Otherwise, it is necessary to make assumptions of normality under
certain conditions. CVaR also improves on VaR because it is a coherent risk measure.
With the assumption of normality the use of the expected value and variance of prices for
determining VaR and CVaR for electricity markets can be illustrated as follows. A generating
firm is considering entering in a forward contract to sell 10000 MWh at a strike price of
$30/MWh one month from now. By using the model presented in this work, the expected
value of the daily average price for the termination date is found to be $32/MWh and
the standard deviation $5/MWh. The VaR per MWh at 95% level of confidence is then
30 − (32 + 1.65 ∗ 5) = $ − 10.25/MWh. As the notional amount is 10000 MWh, the total
VaR at 95% level of confidence results $− 102, 500.
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The CVaR, being the mean of the loss given that the loss is greater than the VaR, can
be computed by integration between −∞ and VaR. Assuming normal distribution as before,
it can be shown that CVaR for 95% level of confidence is µR − 2.05σR and for 99% level
of confidence is µR − 2.64σR. Similar tables to table 3.1 can also be constructed if the
distribution is lognormal instead. In the example, the total CVaR at 95% level of confidence
is [30− (32 + 2.05 ∗ 5)] ∗ 10000 = $− 122, 500.
Table 3.1: Values for VaR and CVaR for normal distribution
Confidence level VaR CVaR
90% µR − 1.28σR µR − 1.76σR
95% µR − 1.65σR µR − 2.05σR
99% µR − 2.33σR µR − 2.64σR
3.2.2 Expected returns – variance of return objective function
Markowitz [45] pointed out that the rule that investors maximize the expected value of
discounted returns when choosing portfolios must be rejected. Between two alternatives
with the same expected discounted return a rational agent will choose the one that has a
smaller variance. And depending on the level of risk aversion, the agent may choose an
alternative with a lower expected return but a smaller variance. The conclusion is that the
investor will choose what the author calls the efficient expected value-variance combination.
As the cited paper shows the portfolio selection process has two stages. The first one
starts with observations and experiences and produces beliefs about the future performance
of securities. The second stage consists of the portfolio selection based on the beliefs.
To apply the Markowitz’ expected value-variance objective function it is necessary to
form the beliefs about the future performance, that is to know the expected value and
variance. This work will help to get reasonable values for the expected values and variances.
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3.3 ELECTRICITY MARKETS
Energy markets are very different from money markets. Among other causes, energy has
many and complex fundamental price drivers that makes it hard to model them. Seasonality,
storage and delivery issues, exogenous events (weather related, wars, etc.), regulation and
centralization also affect the price. For more details see Pilipovic [55].
To give a snapshot on the development of derivatives in electricity markets, for example,
forty-eight different derivatives on electricity are currently traded at the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX): forty-seven different cash-settled futures 6 and one option.
3.3.1 The use of derivatives in electricity markets
A transmission company can conveniently hedge the energy cost by purchasing power several
months ahead. The hedge eliminates price exposure. It is particulary suited to electricity
markets because this purchase does not imply delivery in advance nor storage nor an initial
outlay of funds to pay. In the case of a cash-settlement forward the hedge does not need to
be put on with the ultimate supplier of energy - it can be done with any other counterpart.
This also adapts itself well to electricity markets in which the energy is not delivered directly
from the producer to the buyer but rather is done through the grid.
For example, a transmission company might enter into an OTC cash-settled option con-
tract to hedge the wholesale electricity price. It buys energy at the pool as usual. Should
it exercise the option the counterpart will not deliver electricity in exchange for payment.
It will instead pay the transmission company the option’s intrinsic value. In this manner,
the transmission company is protected against rising electricity prices without changing the
buying process at all. The day-ahead market is a forward market.
6In a cash or financial settlement , the underlier is not physically delivered. Instead, the derivative settles
for an amount of money equal to what the derivative’s market value would be at maturity/expiration if
it were a physically settled derivative. By the contrary, a derivative instrument is physically settled if the
underlier is to be physically delivered in exchange for a specified payment.
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3.3.2 The need of the variance of electricity prices in risk management
The literature on energy risk management emphasizes the need to estimate, calibrate or
obtain volatility of prices using procedures different from the approach given here. Skantze
and Ilic [71] model the forward price as a function of the expected value and variance of
spot prices. Denton, Palmer, Masiello, and Skantze [25] take volatility as a parameter of
the model they use, that must be calibrated from historical data. Burger, Klar, Mu¨ller, and
Schindlmayr [17] state that the volatilities can be calibrated with futures prices as historical
or implied volatilities. Roark, Skantze, and Masiello [60] use Monte Carlo simulation to
sample contracts for reserve from assumed distributions on prices.
Prices of derivatives are strongly related to volatility. There has been no work done
yet on getting the volatility of electricity prices from a stochastic fundamental model. This
work attempts to reverse the process that generates the market-implied volatilities. That is,
estimate the volatilities first and obtain the future prices.
The extreme youth of energies markets, in comparison to money markets, makes the
building of models more difficult. The lack of historical data complicates the process of
valuing derivatives. The market is still very “illiquid” that means that the present-day
market activity is quite small. There is not enough information on spot and forward prices
to understand the price drivers and to test models.
3.4 SUMMARY
As energy options markets develop (especially electricity markets), this study provides in-
sights into spot prices variance estimation, and hence volatility that can be used for deriv-
atives’ valuation and risk measure. Specifically, this model helps to asses the volatilities of
prices, reverting the process of calculating the market-implied volatilities. Instead of starting
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from the future prices and deducing from them the market-implied volatilities, this study
computes the volatilities and helps to determine the future prices consequently.
As described before, the forward prices are influenced by the expected value and the
volatility of electricity spot prices. Concepts as VaR and CVaR are based on the probability
distributions of electricity prices. In this matter, the model here presented is a useful tool
to estimate these risk measures. Moreover, the estimation of expectation and variance of
electricity prices are the first step for an investor to select investments following the expected
value-variance rule.
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4.0 MODELING ELECTRICITY PRICES IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS
Since deregulation started, researchers have made a great effort to study the behavior of
electricity prices in the new open markets. The number of related papers and books that
has been published in the past thirteen years is remarkable.
The objective of this chapter is to review the literature in the light of the work of this
dissertation, and to select and adapt the models for this purpose. The analysis is focused
in three significant models for oligopolies. By the end of the chapter the complete model
proposed here is well defined.
4.1 REVIEW OF ELECTRICITY MARKET MODELS
4.1.1 Game theory, production cost and time series models
Following Batlle [9], electricity price models can be classified into three categories: game
theory models, production-cost models and time series models.
Game theory models are concerned with the strategic behavior of the agents and its
influence on price. Market equilibrium strategies are such that, given the strategies of the
other players, any single firm is better off maintaining its strategy. This is known as the
Nash equilibrium, defined by Fudenberg and Tirole [28], 1.2 as:
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Nash equilibrium is a starting point of most applications of game theory. It is defined as
a profile of strategies such that each player’s strategy is an optimal response to the other
players’ strategies. (. . . )
Equilibrium is determined by the condition that all firms choose the action that is a best
response to the anticipated play of their opponents. (. . . )
Nash equilibria are “consistent” predictions of how the game will be played, in the sense
that if all players predict that a particular Nash equilibrium will occur then no player has
an incentive to play differently. A Nash equilibrium, and only a Nash equilibrium, can have
the property that the players can predict it, predict that their opponents predict it, and so
on.
On the other hand, production-cost (or fundamental) models simulate the energy produc-
tion and market operation mechanisms. They were developed for centralized power markets
and have been extended to the reformed free markets.
Time series models perform statistical analysis on the price data as time series without
capturing either the engineering or the economic aspects involved. Although this category
is the weakest one, because it does not account for the richness and peculiarity of electricity
markets, it uses well-developed statistical tools for analyzing the data. Mateo Gonza´lez,
Mun˜oz San Roque, and Garc´ıa-Gonza´lez [47] provide a wide taxonomy of these models.
The special features of electricity markets mentioned above (see section 2.1) should be
taken into consideration in the model when one is interested in explaining and measuring the
variability of prices. Financial or economic aspects alone do not explain the price evolution
thoroughly.
4.1.2 Production cost models
Methods for computing the expected production costs of a power generating system are well
developed and documented: see Caramanis, Stremel, Fleck, and Daniel [19], Mazumdar [48],
Mazumdar and Kapoor [49], Stremel, Jenkins, Babb, and Bayless [75]. There are two basic
approaches to this computation. The first formulation is due to Baleriaux, Jamoulle, and
de Guertechin [7] in which the time sequence in the chronological variation of the load is
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ignored and the computations are performed based on the load duration curve1. The second
is the use of the chronological simulation models that explicitly trace the evolution of the
system’s states over time using the Monte Carlo method (Breipohl, Lee and Chiang [15]).
Ryan and Mazumdar [65] and [66] pointed out that even under a load duration curve
(LDC) framework, the Baleriaux model is not capable of calculating the variance and higher
order moments of production costs over a given time interval. In order to calculate such
higher order statistics of the production costs, the Baleriaux model needs to be suitably
enhanced so that the statistical dependence between the amounts of energy produced by
different units for every hour within the study interval can be accounted for. These correla-
tions can be evaluated only when the stochastic processes underlying the generator outages
as well as the chronological load sequence are considered.
Using this model, several authors (Huang and Hobbs [36]; Kapoor and Mazumdar [42];
Lee, Lin, and Breipohl [44]; Ryan [64]; Shih and Mazumdar [69]; Shih, Mazumdar, and
Bloom [68]) have provided analytical expressions for the mean and variance of the produc-
tion costs as well as for the hourly average marginal costs over a given interval. This model
has also been used in the Monte Carlo chronological simulation of production costs. In
general, chronological models have great flexibility in modeling operating policies and con-
straints. However, they can also require substantial computational effort especially because
the Monte Carlo method needs repeated runs of the random scenarios to obtain statistically
significant estimates. Variance reduction methods to reduce the number of required Monte
Carlo runs for the production simulation with explicit accounting of the chronological con-
straints were proposed by Mazumdar and Kapoor [50] and Valenzuela and Mazumdar [79].
Similar methods have also been proposed by Breipohl, Lee, Huang, and Feng [16] and by
Marnay and Strauss [46].
1A load duration curve is the demand of all hours of the year, sorted from highest to lowest. In a load
duration curve graph it is possible to read how many hours in a period of time (say, a year) the load is above
or equal to a given amount.
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4.1.3 Electricity market modeling trends
There is a comprehensive and original review on the modeling trends for the electricity market
in the publication by Ventosa, Ba´ıllo, Ramos, and Rivier [84]. It classifies the numerous
papers under different criteria and describes the strengths, weaknesses and main uses of
each group.
The three main stated trends are: optimization models, equilibrium models and simula-
tion models. The first of these three focus on the profit maximization problem for one firm
while the other two sets of models represent the overall market behavior of all the competing
firms. Equilibrium models can handle simplified markets models. Simulation models, on the
other hand, are more suitable for dealing with more complex problems.
The attractiveness of optimization models is that very well-known robust optimization
algorithms exist to solve them. But the disadvantage lies in their not considering the reaction
of competitors in the market to the firm’s optimal strategy in the model. They are not
suitable for medium- and long-term decisions.
Equilibrium models are the most numerous of the three. The many papers on these
models are mainly based on two types of market equilibrium: Cournot equilibrium and
Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE). In both cases the underlying concept is the Nash
equilibrium mentioned earlier. Later on the two equilibria will be considered in greater
details. In Cournot competition the players offer quantities while in SFE competition they
offer supply curves (quantity-price). Cournot models are more tractable but the assumptions
are less realistic. On the contrary, SFE models better capture the bid process but, in general,
they give rise a system of differential equations which are much more difficult to solve. In a
very few cases, however, is it possible to get a closed form solution.
These models have been used for many purposes that include market power analysis,
market design, medium-term electricity pricing, economic planning, investment planning
and congestion management.
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Simulation models can handle complex equilibrium models which otherwise would need
cumbersome mathematical calculation and computing time. They can also capture the
iterative characteristic of electricity markets which provides players with the opportunity to
learn from previous interactions and thus adjust their strategies.
4.1.4 Fundamental stochastic models
As it was mentioned in chapter 1, few models have a fundamental and stochastic approach
at the same time.
One of these models is proposed by Skantze, Gubina, and Ilic [70]. Their model is
founded on the assumption of inelastic demand and on an exponential supply function. The
spot price at time t is given by
Pt = e
aLt+bt (4.1)
where
a is a fixed parameter characterizing the bid curve slope (the same for every t),
Lt is the market clearing quantity in hour t and
bt denotes the position or shift of the curve.
The stochasticity of load is modeled in Lt while that of supply is done in bt. The factors
included on the load side are seasonality, uncertainty, mean reversion and stochastic growth.
The factors considered on the supply side are the stochastic availability of generation, un-
certain fuel costs, unit commitment and import/export from and to other markets. They
consider the expected value of the price but not the variance.
A second fundamental stochastic model is due to Vehvila¨inen and Pyykko¨nen [83]. This
model considers the case of the Nordic market in which more than half of the production
is hydro-electric power based and approximately one fourth is nuclear power, both of which
have zero or very low variable costs. They model some fundamental factors separately and
then combine them into a market equilibrium model. The factors under consideration are:
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climate data (temperature and precipitation), hydro-balance (temperature below zero, snow-
pack level, snow melting, hydro-inflow, hydro reservoir level, hydro spill), demand and base
load supply.
For the market equilibrium they assume that demand is not elastic, so the supply price
function gives the spot price at the level of inelastic demand. They use Monte Carlo simu-
lation to obtain the distribution of the spot price.
4.1.5 The selection of a framework model
The research objective is to study the variance of electricity prices. Necessarily an appropri-
ate price model must be selected. The following conclusions help to do it.
First, time series models were discarded because they fall short of capturing the internal
characteristics of the production process and the market mechanisms.
Second, an integrated simplified game theory / production cost model is preferred to
combine equilibrium aspects with the market and generation processes.
Third, the model to be used must necessarily be a probabilistic one. The model should
recognize the different sources of uncertainty and propagate them on to the output price.
Fourth, in all the countries where deregulation is in place power markets are oligopolies.
Therefore, an imperfect-market equilibrium model matched with a stochastic production-
cost model has been developed. The uncertainty sources chosen are demand and units’ avail-
ability. This combined model considers the influence of economic issues in electricity pricing
such as market power, capacity withholding, bidding strategies and market concentration.
This work uses three paradigmatic equilibrium models for imperfect-market (Bertrand,
Cournot, and a specific SFE), which are described in section 4.2. A comparison of the three
parallel approaches may provide useful information to market designers.
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The specific SFE model selected is Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen’s formulation (see
subsection 4.3.2) because of the following reasons:
• It represents a Nash equilibrium, which means that it is stable and predictable.
• It uses realistic stepwise supply functions.
• It considers a number of competing firms.
• It explains markups over marginal costs depending on demand level, daily peak demand,
cost of supramarginal units which is intuitive or, at least, coherent.
• It gives a closed form expression for the electricity price, enabling derivation of the
expected value and variance.
• It is possible to carry out sensitivity analysis on it.
One drawback of the formula is that it only applies to a symmetrical market consisting
of identical firms. This assumption is not very realistic.
4.2 BASIC MODELS ON ELECTRICITY PRICING
In the current literature three major models are in use for (imperfect) electricity markets: the
Bertrand model, Cournot model and Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) model. Cournot
and Bertrand models constitute the two often used paradigms of imperfect competition.
4.2.1 Bertrand model
In the Bertrand (1883) model firms compete in price. They simultaneously choose prices and
then must produce enough output to meet demand after the price choices become known. In
the assumption that each firm has enough capacity to meet demand, the Nash equilibrium
price in this model is the marginal cost which is the same as the case of perfect competition.
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One of the reasons to introduce competition into power markets is to reduce the price
of electricity. It was thought that under competition the prices would drop to the marginal
cost level. It is generally admitted that the design of the British Pool was based on the
assumption that Bertrand competition would prevail. However, this is not what happened.
A first example of the use of Bertrand competition in electricity was proposed by Hobbs
[34] for studying the restructuring of the industry in the US. The rationale for retaining this
paradigm is as follows. Electricity cannot be stored. If a generator has extra capacity it will
be interested in selling electricity if and only if the price is above the cost of production. It
will thus be subject to short-term price competition, hence leading to a Bertrand assumption.
The latter is equivalent to perfect competition. It supposes marginal cost pricing when supply
and demand curves meet in a single location and all producers have the same marginal costs.
However, empirical studies (Wolfram [92]) have shown that prices in some imperfect markets
are sustained well above marginal costs.
4.2.2 Cournot model
The other basic non-cooperative equilibrium is the Cournot (1838) model. In this model
competition is in quantities. Firms simultaneously choose the quantities they will produce,
which they then sell at the market-clearing price (the price for which demand is met by
supply). An auctioneer will clear the market equating demand and production.
The point made by the proponents of this model (Borenstein and Bushnell [13], Bat-
stone [10], Wen and David [87]) is that a large proportion of energy transactions are done
by long-term contracts for which the price is fixed. Taking away the amount of electricity
contracted, the remaining demand for electricity is much more elastic than that of the whole
market. Small variations in price will produce large changes in demand. So firms will choose
the quantities that optimize their profit. Under these situations the Cournot model is a
more accurate representation of the market. Since generation capacities present significant
constraints in electricity markets, the assumption underlying the Bertrand model that com-
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petition is over prices and the firms have enough capacity to meet demand is not sustainable.
Cournot models prevail over Bertrand models in the current literature on electricity markets.
4.2.3 Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) models
A new model has been used in recent papers (Green and Newbery [32], Bolle [12], Newbery
[52] [53], Rudkevich, Duckworth and Rosen [63], Visudhipan and Ilic [85] [86], Baldick, Grant
and Kahn [5], Guan, Ho, and Pepyne [33], Baldick and Hogan [6], Baldick [4]). This approach
is based upon the work of Klemperer and Meyer [43] and was applied to a pool model by
Green and Newbery [32]. A supply function relates quantity to price. It shows the prices
at which a firm is willing to sell different quantities of output. The SFE model applies very
well to the market structure of many restructured electricity markets, such as New Zealand,
Australia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) and California Power
Exchange. In these markets the bid format is precisely a supply function.
In this model competition is neither over price (as in Bertrand models) nor quantity (as
in Cournot models) but in supply functions. Bertrand and Cournot models are limits of SFE
models. The Bertrand model is the limiting case in which the supply function is constant
in price for any quantity, which means that the producer is bidding a price at which it is
willing to sell any quantity. On the other hand, the Cournot model is the limiting case in
which the supply function is constant in quantity for any price, meaning that the producer
is bidding quantity that will be sold at the market-clearing price.
The problem with the use of SFE models is that in general there is not a unique equi-
librium. There are often an infinite number of solutions lying between the Cournot and
Bernard equilibria, which represent their upper and lower limits in price respectively. The
existence of many equilibria makes it difficult to predict the likely outcome of strategic inter-
action between players. There are some factors that reduce the range of feasible equilibria:
uncertainty of demand and capacity constraints.
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SFE models better explain the markups of electricity prices which empirical studies have
shown to be above the Bertrand equilibrium but below the Cournot model. It is close to
the Cournot equilibrium at peak time when capacities are almost saturated and close to the
Bertrand equilibrium when there is a significant capacity excess.
4.3 MORE ON SUPPLY FUNCTION EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
4.3.1 Basic papers on Supply Function Equilibrium
The basic paper for Supply Function Equilibrium models is by Klemperer and Meyer [43].
They model an oligopoly facing uncertain demand in which each firm chooses as its strategy
a supply function relating quantity to price. In the absence of uncertainty, there exists an
enormous multiplicity of equilibria in supply functions, but uncertainty dramatically reduces
the set of equilibria. Under uncertainty and considering a linear demand function and a linear
marginal cost, they prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in supply functions for
a symmetric oligopoly2 producing a homogenous good if the random exogenous shock has full
support. The exogenous shock ξ is the random variable(s), not under our control (weather,
failures) which is(are) the source of uncertainty. Having full support means that it can take
any value with the restriction that demand D(p, ξ) > 0 and price p > 0.
Green and Newbery [32] apply the work of Klemperer and Meyer [43] to study the
British electricity spot market at the time of the structural changes in 1992, and show that
two dominant generating firms following Nash equilibrium strategies in supply schedules will
price electricity with high markups over marginal cost. In their model they consider first a
symmetric duopoly. In this case the symmetric solution is
dq
dp
=
q
p− C ′ (q) +Dp (4.2)
2An oligopoly is symmetric if all the players have identical costs, capacity and knowledge.
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in which
p is the spot price
q is the supply quantity
C(q) is the cost of producing the quantity q
C ′(q) is its marginal cost
D(p, ξ) is the demand curve given ξ
ξ is a random exogenous shock
Dp is the partial derivative of D with respect to p.
The meaning of the exogenous shock ξ is that the demand D as a function of price p
can be modified by external causes like ambient temperature, humidity, lack or excess of
any other energy source that are not under control. The demand curve can be shifted up or
down because of these or other reasons that happen randomly. Klemperer and Meyer [43]
assume that the second order partial derivative Dpξ = 0 for all (p, ξ).
Equation (4.2) is central to the Supply Function Equilibrium theory on which this work
is based. For this reason, the following paragraphs and figure 4.1 are taken from Green and
Newbery [32] to justify equation (4.2).
Consider points (q, p) such that
C ′(q) < p < C ′(q)− q
Dp
(4.3)
Then at such points 0 < dq/dp <∞, and the trajectory of the differential equation through
this point has a well-defined positive directional slope. It can be shown that all such trajec-
tories pass through the origin, where they have the same slope. The next step is to consider
the stationaries whose equations define the lower and upper limits in equation (4.3). Con-
sider the first equation p = C ′(q). This is the supply schedule of a perfectly competitive
firm, and along this curve (shown as the lower dotted line in figure 4.1), dq/dp = ∞, so
dp/dq = 0. Any trajectory that intersects the lower stationary reaches it with horizontal
slope at a point such as B in figure 4.1, and once it has crossed the stationary it will have
a negative slope.
If the trajectory reaches the upper stationary (the dashed line in figure 4.1) at a point such
as C, its slope there will be dq/dp = 0, so dp/dq =∞. It will cross the stationary vertically
and then bend back. The upper stationary has a simple interpretation as the Cournot supply
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Figure 4.1: Supply function equilibrium solutions of Green and Newbery equation
schedule, for if firm j has unresponsive output kj, then firm i is an effective monopolist
with qi = D(p, ξ)− kj. The profit-maximizing choice of p satisfies
qi + [p− C ′(qi)]Dp = 0 (4.4)
or
p = C ′(q)− q
Dp
(4.5)
In general, therefore, the duopoly supply schedule lies between the competitive and Cournot
schedules along a trajectory such as OA in figure 4.1. Candidates for equilibrium supply
schedules must not intersect either stationary over the range of possible price-output pairs.
The last sentence of the quote means that a point such as A (where the trajectory cross
either (upper or lower) stationary must be outside the segments OC or OB respectively. In
figure 4.1, if BC is the maximum demand, then all feasible solutions to equation (4.2) lie
between the curves OC (maximum supply function) and OB (minimum supply function).
Therefore, there are infinitely many solutions. As it was mentioned above, Klemperer and
Meyer [43] proved uniqueness in the specific case of linear demand, linear marginal cost and
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full support for the exogenous shock. In figure 4.1, this means that the demand CB can be
in any place. Note that if demand BC moves to the right (or up, which is the same), the set
of of feasible solutions is reduced. In the limit to infinite there is only one solution.
The effect of supply constraints is to narrow the range of feasible equilibria. In the
asymmetric case less output would be sold at a higher price.
To justify equation (4.5) note that the profit of firm i can be expressed as
pii(p) = p[D(p, ξ)− kj]− C(D(p, ξ)− kj) (4.6)
The first order condition is
dpii(p)
dp
= [D(p, ξ)− kj] + pDp − C ′(D(p, ξ)− kj)Dp = 0 (4.7)
and considering that the residual demand for firm i is qi = D(p, ξ)−kj, last equation becomes
dpii(p)
dp
= qi + pDp − C ′(qi)Dp = 0 (4.8)
which is the same equation (4.4)
4.3.2 A specific case of SFE: Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen
The two preceding papers, Klemperer and Meyer [43] and Green and Newbery [32], were the
basis for further research on application of SFE to electricity markets. Since their publications
many authors have applied SFE to study different market scenarios.
Rudkevich, Duckworth and Rosen [63] calculated the electricity prices that would result
from a pure pool market with identical profit-maximizing generating firms, bidding stepwise
supply functions. They extended the theoretical concepts developed by Klemperer and Meyer
[43] and Green and Newbery [32], and proposed a new formula for the instantaneous market-
clearing price when generating firms adopt bidding strategies given by the Nash equilibrium
using several assumptions:
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• the generating firms are identical in size and have identical supply curves;
• the supply curves are stepwise;
• there is zero price elasticity of demand;
• generating firms have perfect information about one another’s production cost curves;
• generating firms have equal accuracy in predicting demand.
The Nash equilibrium market-clearing price of electricity in a pool is a function of:
• the particular electric system’s production cost curve (i.e., the size of the steps of capacity,
and the increases in variable cost between these steps);
• the instantaneous demand for electricity;
• the maximum anticipated demand in the overall period for which bids are submitted;
• the number of identical generating firms bidding in the pool;
and is given by:
P (Q) = dk +
m−1∑
j=k
(dj+1 − dj)
(
Q
Cj
)n−1
(4.9)
where
P is the instantaneous market-clearing price of electricity in a given time interval.
Q is the instantaneous demand in a given time interval.
k is the dispatch order number of the generating unit that is on the margin in that time
interval.
n is the number of identical firms.
dk is the variable cost of the marginal unit.
j, dj are respectively the dispatch order number and the variable cost of the generating units
that are above the margin in that time interval and are expected to be on or below the
margin in some other time interval during the 24-hour period.
m is the dispatch order number of the most expensive unit expected to run during the 24-
hour period.
Cj is the total capacity of all generating units with dispatch order not exceeding j.
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It is important to note that in the above formula Q is always less than Cj, which means
that the effect on price of generating units beyond the marginal one decreases with the
increase of the dispatch order number.
The formula (4.9), being a solution of a differential equation, needed a boundary condi-
tion. Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen made the assumption that the price at peak demand
is the marginal cost of the peak marginal unit, taking the lowest SFE possible.
Considering the nature of electricity markets, Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen’s for-
mula is selected as a third model of market equilibrium for the following reasons:
• it assumes stepwise supply functions, as is the case in most actual markets,
• the structure of the market (e.g., number of firms) is reflected in the formula,
• it builds the price adding to the marginal cost other terms that depend on the generating
units profile, on the daily peak demand and on the relation between the latter and the
installed capacity.
4.4 THE COMPLETE MODEL
The objective of this work is to get an expression for the price variance considering uncer-
tainty of supply and demand and market equilibrium. In deregulated markets prices result
above marginal costs, contrary to what was originally thought. The reason is that power
markets are not perfect: only a few players actually influence the price.
After reviewing how the electricity markets work (chapter 2), the need for tools for energy
risk management (chapter 3) and the literature on electricity pricing models (the present
chapter), this section defines the model with its attributes and limitations.
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4.4.1 Supply model and the grid
It is assumed that power generation system consists of n symmetric firms which own a total
of N generating units. Each one owns an identical set of N/n units. Each unit i in the set
is assumed to have the following technical characteristics:
• variable cost di [$/MWh]
• capacity ci [MW]
• mean time to failure λ−1i [hour]
• mean time to repair µ−1i [hour]
Mean time to failure and mean time to repair are considered to be exponentially distrib-
uted. The steady state of the units is assumed.
This work admits the possibility of importing energy from an external market at a certain
price. This source is modeled as an expensive dummy generating unit of unlimited capacity.
This assumption assures that load is met at every moment.
Transmission constraints are not considered in this study. It can be seen as a one-node
model in which there is only one price.
4.4.2 Market model
It is a pay-as-bid market. There exists a day-ahead market and a spot market. The firms
simultaneously submit supply curve offers in the day-ahead market. A merit-order sorting
based on the offers is used to dispatch the units to meet demand. There exists an Independent
System Operator (ISO) that clears the day-ahead market by considering the offers and the
expected demand. The offers stay the same for the spot market and are used to meet the
actual demand the following day, setting the spot price.
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4.4.3 Bidding strategies
Three bidding models are studied:
• the Bertrand model in which firms offer their marginal costs
• the Cournot model in which firms offer quantities that optimize the expected profit
• the SFE model in which firms offer a supply curve (quantity-price combination) based
on the Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen’s equilibrium formula.
4.4.4 Demand model
In the first approach (chapters 5 and 6), the hourly demand is considered a normal random
variable with mean µt, standard deviation σt and covariances σr,t. σt is considered to be
small enough with respect to µt to negate the possibility of a negative load. This approach
is called load model 1.
In the second approach (chapter 8) hourly demand is modeled as a regression equation
with temperature as an independent deterministic variable plus a remaining stochastic term
for each hour. This last component is studied in two ways. The first one is considering
each hourly remaining term as normally distributed but not independent. This is called load
model 2. The second way is considering the remaining terms as a time series. This is called
load model 3. It is assumed that temperature can be forecasted accurately for the next 24
hours. The time series component reflects the correlation between loads at consecutive hours
and also between the same hours on the same weekdays of consecutive weeks.
For the numerical examples, this work considers demand and prices only for weekdays
given that weekends and holidays have a different daily pattern. For the Cournot model,
demand is assumed to be linear with respect to price and to have certain price elasticity.
A range of elasticity values is considered. Instead of using the elasticity defined as a ratio
that measures the change in quantity respect to change in price, the first derivative Dp of
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demand with respect to price, which also measures that relationship, is used. For the SFE
model, the assumption is zero elasticity of demand.
4.4.5 Time line
At the moment of doing the calculations (hours, days, weeks or months in advance), the
demand estimate, the temperature forecast and the steady state of the generating units are
known. To make decisions on the offer curve on the day-ahead, a more accurate temperature
and load forecast will be at hand for the following 24 hours. The model does not take into
account the actual working status of the units, but the steady state of them.
The objective is to predict prices to make decisions. In the short- and medium-term
(weeks, months) the estimates may be useful to schedule units’ maintenance, to do cash-flow
projections, and to make decisions on Contracts-for-Differences (CfD). In the very-short-term
(tomorrow, days), pricing and unit commitment decisions will be based on this knowledge.
4.4.6 Price under study
This work models the spot (real time) price of energy. It may be the System Marginal Price
(SMP) of a one-part market or the Locational Marginal Price (LMP) of a two-part market.
Side payments or other components of the price are not the object of this study. Formulas
for the expected value and variance of hourly prices (chapter 5) and of the average of hourly
prices (chapter 6) are derived. The price average can be done in a 24-hour period, or for
peak hours or for off-peak hours.
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4.4.7 Limitations of the model
The most significant limitation is the assumption of symmetry that means that all the
competing firms are supposed to be identical in number and characteristics of units, capacity,
and knowledge of the market. This assumption is far removed from reality. It is necessary,
though, in order to retain the closed form expressions. It can be partially justified by noting
that only a few firms really influence price: those that usually owns the marginal unit. It is
assumed that those are not the small firms, which are price-takers, but the large ones. So
there is a first filter for small companies which provide energy for base load. Only the big
firms are considered identical. Even if the firms were actually identical, the randomness of
the availability of units would break the theoretical and assumed symmetry.
Another important limitation is that the model does not consider transmission con-
straints. Line congestion forces some units to stop generating because one or more lines are
saturated. That means that the merit order is broken. Other more expensive units must
be called on to supply energy to those nodes where the congested lines can not transmit
electricity. This is the reason for having different prices in different locations: the Locational
Marginal Prices (LMP). This limitation may be acceptable considering that this is the case
only in a few locations during few hours. In PJM 2005 State of the Market [57], table 7.6
shows that in 2004 the congestion-event hours 3 were on the average 2.2% of the total an-
nual hours, while in 2005 the average went up to 5.1%. In terms of prices the congestion
component of the LMP is very small as it was in 2004: around 1%.4
A third limitation is that the unit commitment problem is neglected. In real markets,
minimum up and down times have significant repercussion on the units that are called on
to serve energy. Sometimes it is more economic to keep a more expensive unit running
instead of turning it off, closing-down a cheaper one for a period because this has smaller
start-up and shut-down costs or less technical constraints. The unit commitment problem
is a challenging problem in itself. Attempting to consider it here would be quite difficult.
3The convention is that if congestion occurs for 20 minutes or more in an hour, the hour is congested.
4See figures 7.9 to 7.40 in PJM 2005 State of the Market [57].
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A fourth one is that fuel costs are assumed to be deterministic in this model which in
real word are also random variables. A plausible defense is that fuel prices do not have large
variances, especially in the short-term.
4.5 SUMMARY
After reviewing the literature on electricity pricing and the different models that have been
used, this chapter describes the model profile considered in this work highlighting its as-
sumptions and limitations.
This model is unique; and contributes to the state of the art in the following respect:
• it fills in the gap in the literature combining a fundamental approach (both in the gen-
erating process and in the pricing process as well) with a stochastic outlook;
• the stochasticity includes uncertainty from the load and from the availability of the units;
• it considers Nash equilibrium solutions, which, according to game theory, are considered
the prevailing outcomes for the prices;
• no other work has been done up to date, using an analytical model to compute the
variance of electricity prices.
This work incorporates stochastic behavior to classic and modern theory on oligopolies
done for deterministic scenarios. Thus, it enhances the formulas presented in this chapter
to cover more realistic situations. The consideration of three bidding behaviors enriches the
understanding of the model giving lower and upper bounds of prices and their variances.
Furthermore, the use of closed form expressions enables to adapt the model to different
markets and to change the system configuration in the same markets. The cost that is
paid to get these insights are some assumptions that are removed from real markets, and
constitute limitations to the model, especially those related to symmetry of firms.
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5.0 MEAN AND VARIANCE OF THE HOURLY PRICE
In a deregulated market, price is a random variable resulting from various sources of uncer-
tainty: demand, fuel costs, reliability of the generating units, bidding behavior, transmission
congestion.
Utility managers classify the load (demand) in three main segments: base load, interme-
diate load and peak load. Base load is power that is used continuously and it is the cheapest:
large coal-fired and nuclear stations usually supply it. Intermediate load is electricity needed
for several hours a day, or even the whole day, but not every day. Utilities use more expen-
sive units to provide intermediate load: some hydro plants and Combined Cycle Turbines.
Peak load is electricity used to meet extreme demand. It is not needed very often, just a
few hours a day or a week. The machines used to meet peak load are much more expensive:
e.g., combustion turbines.
To estimate the profitability (measured as revenues minus costs) of base load units utility
managers can rely on monthly or even annual average prices. Those units are expected to run
without interruption. To calculate intermediate load units’ profitability, a monthly average
is not good enough. As these units run for several hours a day, but not every day, the
generating companies may need to estimate the electricity price for the day(s) the units will
be in use. Given that the volatility of electricity prices is high, the expected value alone will
not be sufficient for purposes of prediction. At a minimum, the variance of the daily average
will be also needed. Finally, for the profitability analysis of peak load units, the expected
value and the variance of the hourly price must be at hand.
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The study of the hourly prices are useful for scheduling maintenance of the individual
units, and to decide on what kind of units are more needed: base, intermediate or peak load
units.
This chapter focuses on the expected value and variance of hourly prices, to predict the
price of electricity for a given hour. The following chapter studies the expected value and
variance of the daily average price. The same techniques can be used for obtaining estimates
for weekly or monthly average prices.
5.1 CONDITIONAL EXPRESSIONS FOR THE MEAN AND VARIANCE
OF THE HOURLY PRICE
Ignoring unit commitment constraints, it is assumed that the system consists of N+1 gener-
ating units, which are dispatched in an ascending merit order , based on the production cost
of each one. Utilities will offer energy (quantity and price), unit by unit, to the Independent
System Operator (ISO). The latter will order the units by offered price, and dispatch the
units from the cheapest to the more expensive ones, until the demand is met. This is the
case with PJM and many other electricity markets.
Conditioning on the marginal unit1 J(t), the expected value of the price can be written
as follows
E[p(t)] =
N+1∑
j=1
E[p(t)|J(t) = j]Pr[J(t) = j] (5.1)
where j is the merit order index. j = 1, 2, 3, ..., N + 1.
The variance can be calculated as
V ar[p(t)] = E[p(t)2]− E2[p(t)] (5.2)
1Marginal unit is the last unit called on to produce electricity to meet demand.
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where E[p(t)2] can be computed conditioning on J(t), as was done before
E[p(t)2] =
N+1∑
j=1
E[p(t)2|J(t) = j]Pr[J(t) = j] (5.3)
In order to get the expected value and the variance of the price at the time t the proba-
bility mass function of J(t) is needed. The following section summarizes Valenzuela’s work
[76] on this topic.
5.2 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARGINAL UNIT
First note that
Pr[J(t) = j] = Pr[J(t) > j − 1]− Pr[J(t) > j] (5.4)
Among many other sources of uncertainty which influence the randomness of J(t), two
are being considered: the load at time t, L(t), and the availability of the generating units.
The following random variables capture the availability of generators
Yi(t) =
 1 if unit i is up at time t0 if unit i is down at time t
It is assumed that Yi(t) and Yj(t) are independent for i 6= j.
ci is defined to be the capacity of the unit i. It follows that
∑j
i=1 ciYi(t) is the available
capacity of the first j units at time t.
The model assumes a failure rate of unit i being λi and the repair rate being µi. The
mean time to fail is consequently the inverse
1
λi
; and the mean time to repair is
1
µi
.
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Thus the steady-state proportion of time that the generating unit i is up is pi =
µi
λi + µi
and the complement proportion of time that the generating unit is down is qi = 1 − pi =
λi
λi + µi
, also known as Forced Outage Rate (FOR) .
Defining L(t) to be the load at time t, note that the events [J(t) > j] and [L(t) −∑j
i=1 ciYi(t) > 0] are equivalent. J(t) > j means that the marginal unit is beyond unit j,
which implies that the load L(t) is larger than the available capacity up to unit j, L(t) >∑j
i=1 ciYi(t) . So
Pr[J(t) > j] = Pr[L(t)−
j∑
i=1
ciYi(t) > 0] (5.5)
An auxiliary variable is defined
Xj(t) = L(t)−
j∑
i=1
ciYi(t) (5.6)
with a cumulative distribution function Gj(x; t) = Pr[Xj(t) ≤ x].
Thus, Xj(t) is the excess of load that is not being met by the available generated power
up to generating unit j. It is assumed that L(t) and Yi(t) are independent for all i. Equation
(5.5) can be written as
Pr[J(t) > j] = Pr[Xj(t) > 0]
= 1−Gj(0; t) (5.7)
And thus equation (5.4) reduces to
Pr [J (t) = j] = Gj (0; t)−Gj−1 (0; t) (5.8)
Assuming the random variable components of Xj(t) to be independent, for a relatively
large j, the distribution of Xj(t) can be modeled as normal, by the Central Limit Theorem.
But the normal approximation is not valid for small values of j, and may not be very accurate
when computing the tail probabilities for any j. Valenzuela [76] shows that the Edgeworth
expansion is a better approximation in these cases.
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The Edgeworth expansion of the distribution function of Xj(t) is given in Cramer [20]
Gj(x; t) ∼= Φ(z) +
[
1
6
K3j
K2j(t)3/2
(1− z2) + 1
24
K4j
K2j(t)2
(3z − z3)
+
1
72
K32j
K2j(t)3
(−15z + 10z3 − z5)
]
φ(z) (5.9)
where z = zj(x; t) =
x−K1j(t)√
K2j(t)
, Φ(z) is the standard normal cumulative probability dis-
tribution function, φ(z) is the standard normal probability density function with mean zero
and unit variance; and
K1j(t) = E [Xj (t)] = µt −
j∑
i=1
cipi (5.10)
K2j(t) = V ar [Xj (t)] = σ
2
t +
j∑
i=1
c2i piqi (5.11)
K3j =
j∑
i=1
c3i piqi(pi − qi) (5.12)
K4j =
j∑
i=1
c4i piqi(p
2
i − 4piqi + q2i ) (5.13)
where µt and σ
2
t are the mean and variance of L(t) respectively; ci is the nominal capacity
of unit i; pi is the proportion of time that unit i is up; and qi is the proportion of time that
unit i is down; pi + qi = 1.
pi can be computed through pi =
µi
λi + µi
where λ−1i is the mean time to failure and µ
−1
i
is the mean time to repair for unit i.
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5.3 EXPECTED VALUE AND VARIANCE OF MARGINAL COST
For results to be later derived it is useful to compute the expected value and the variance of
dJ(t). They are calculated as follows conditioning on J(t) once again
E[dJ(t)] =
N+1∑
j=1
E[dJ(t)|J(t) = j]Pr[J(t) = j] =
N+1∑
j=1
E[dj]Pr[J(t) = j] (5.14)
Similarly
V ar[dJ(t)] = E[d
2
J(t)]− E[dJ(t)]2 =
N+1∑
j=1
E[d2j ]Pr[J(t) = j]− E2[dJ(t)] (5.15)
If dj has a distribution, with mean E[dj] and variance V ar[dj] the formulas above hold
and equation (5.15) can be written as
V ar[dJ(t)] =
N+1∑
j=1
{
V ar[dj] + E
2[dj]
}
Pr[J(t) = j]− E2[dJ(t)] (5.16)
In the rest of this work the dj’s will be considered as known and deterministic constants.
So, equations (5.14) and (5.15) can be written as
E[dJ(t)] =
N+1∑
j=1
djPr[J(t) = j] (5.17)
V ar[dJ(t)] =
N+1∑
j=1
d2jPr[J(t) = j]− E2[dJ(t)] (5.18)
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5.4 EXPECTED VALUE OF THE EQUIVALENT LOAD
In order to consider the uncertainty of the load and the reliability of the units as well, the
random variable called equivalent load is defined as
L¯J(t)(t) = L(t) +
J(t)∑
i=1
[1− Yi(t)]ci (5.19)
The equivalent load is the load that could have been delivered if all the units up to the
marginal were working. The expected value of the equivalent load is
E[L¯J(t)(t)] =
N+1∑
j=1
E[L¯J(t)(t)|J(t) = j]Pr[J(t) = j] (5.20)
The cumulative capacity up to generating unit j is defined to be Cj =
∑j
i=1 ci
Note that the events [J(t) = j] and [Cj−1 < L¯J(t)(t) ≤ Cj] are equivalent.
So,
E
[
L¯J(t) (t) |J (t) = j
]
= E
[
L¯J(t) (t) |Cj−1 < L¯J(t) (t) ≤ Cj
]
= E
[
L¯j (t) |Cj−1 < L¯j (t) ≤ Cj
]
(5.21)
L¯j (t) is defined as the equivalent load at time t assuming that J (t) = j.
An approximation of the expected value and variance of the equivalent load is described
in appendix A.1, using Edgeworth formula. For the purpose of this study, a simpler approx-
imation of E[L¯J(t)(t)|J(t) = j] will be used. The reason for doing this is that none of them
is an exact derivation; and the latter, being close enough, is much easier to compute.
There are many reasonable approximations to the equivalent load: Cj−1,
Cj−1 + Cj
2
, Cj.
The selected one in this work is
E[L¯J(t)(t)|J(t) = j] ∼= Cj (5.22)
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This is justified by considering that, if Cj−1 < L¯J(t)(t) ≤ Cj, the difference Cj − L¯J(t)(t)
is smaller than cj. In practice, a power market has many units, such that an error smaller
than the capacity of a single unit is negligible, from a practical point of view. In appendix
A.3, a table shows the difference between outputs of the model in chapters 5 and 6 in the
two extreme cases: approximating L¯J(t)(t) with Cj and with Cj−1. The differences turn to
be very small, justifying the selected approximation.
Substituting equation (5.22) in equation (5.20), the following approximation holds
E[L¯J(t)(t)] ∼=
N+1∑
j=1
CjPr[J(t) = j] (5.23)
5.5 BERTRAND MODEL
Under the Bertrand model, the market-clearing price is the marginal cost. That is
p(t) = dJ(t) (5.24)
So, using equation (5.17) the expected price at hour t is:
E[p(t)]B = E[dJ(t)] =
N+1∑
j=1
djPr[J(t) = j] (5.25)
Similarly, the variance can be calculated using equation (5.18):
V ar[p(t)]B = V ar[dJ(t)] =
N+1∑
j=1
d2jPr[J(t) = j]− E2[p(t)]B (5.26)
69
5.6 COURNOT MODEL
Green and Newbery [32] derive the Cournot model formula for the basic case of a symmetric
duopoly:
p(t)Cournot = dJ(t) − q(t)
Dp
(5.27)
where q(t) =
L(t)
2
and Dp < 0 is the derivative of the total system demand D(t, p) with
respect to price. Following Green [30], it is assumed in this work that the total demand
D(t, p) is a linear function of price. L(t) is the demand realization at time t, which has to
be met.
The expression for q(t) is obtained based on the fact that firm i faces the residual demand
qi(t) = L(t)−q−i(t), where q−i(t) is the quantity provided by the rest of the competing firms.
In equilibrium and under a symmetric duopoly, qi(t) = q−i(t) = q(t), then q(t) =
L(t)
2
.
The formula (5.27) can be generalized for the case of n symmetric firms. In this case, the
residual demand for firm i is also qi(t) = L(t)− q−i(t). In equilibrium and under symmetry,
q(t) = L(t)− (n− 1)q(t). Then, q(t) = L(t)
n
.
Two more considerations must be made. The first is that when the reliability of the
generating units is taken into consideration the symmetry is lost. The second is the need to
distinguish between the quantity offered and the actual quantity produced. Denoting q(t)
as the quantity offered by each firm, actual supply is
nq(t)−
J(t)∑
i=1
[1− Yi(t)]ci
At any time t, actual supply must equal actual demand. Therefore,
L(t) = nq(t)−
J(t)∑
i=1
[1− Yi(t)]ci (5.28)
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Consequently, to capture the uncertainty of the state of the generating units in equation
(5.27) the following expression is used
q(t) =
L(t) +
∑J(t)
i=1 [1− Yi(t)]ci
n
=
L¯J(t)(t)
n
(5.29)
as an approximation, because the symmetry has been lost.
Another way to visualize the last equation is by considering that companies must “sup-
ply” energy to account for the actual load plus the energy “lost” through outages, which
is referred to the equivalent load. This heuristic formula is not rigorous, but it should be
applicable for the purpose of determining the price under the merit order procedure used
in the power markets. If a unit is out on forced outage, the ISO calls on the following one
in the merit order. The effect on the price is exactly the same as a demand increase in the
same amount as that of the capacity of the failed units.
When D(p, t) is linear with respect to p, equation(5.27) can be generalized by
p(t)C = dJ(t) −
L¯J(t)(t)
nDp
(5.30)
The expected value of p(t) following the Cournot model is
E[p(t)]C = E[dJ(t)]− E
[
L¯J(t)(t)
nDp
]
= E[dJ(t)]− 1
nDp
E[L¯J(t)(t)] (5.31)
Substituting equation (5.17) and considering the approximation given by (5.23) in equa-
tion (5.31):
E[p(t)]C ∼=
N+1∑
j=1
djPr[J(t) = j]− 1
nDp
N+1∑
j=1
CjPr[J(t) = j]
=
N+1∑
j=1
(
dj − Cj
nDp
)
Pr[J(t) = j] (5.32)
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The variance can be calculated using equation (5.2):
V ar[p(t)]C = V ar
[
dJ(t) − 1
nDp
L¯J(t)(t)
]
= E
[(
dJ(t) − 1
nDp
L¯J(t)(t)
)2]
− E2
[
dJ(t) − 1
nDp
L¯J(t)(t)
]
=
N+1∑
j=1
E
[(
dJ(t) − 1
nDp
L¯J(t)(t)
)2
|J(t) = j
]
Pr[J(t) = j]− E2[p(t)]C
∼=
N+1∑
j=1
(
dj − Cj
nDp
)2
Pr[J(t) = j]− E2[p(t)]C (5.33)
5.7 SUPPLY FUNCTION EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen’s [63] formula for deterministic load is as follows
p(t) = dJ(t) +
M−1∑
i=J(t)
(di+1 − di)
(
L(t)
Ci
)n−1
(5.34)
where M is the dispatch order number of the most expensive unit expected to run during
the 24-hour period.
As discussed earlier, the outage of units has the same effect on price as a shift upwards of
the load, in the same amount of the power that cannot be delivered. In order to consider the
uncertainty of the load and the availability of the units simultaneously, the same procedure
that has been used for the Cournot model is applied here: using the equivalent load L¯J(t)(t)
defined in equation (5.19) instead of the actual load LJ(t).
The following heuristic formula comes from modifying equation (5.34)
p(t) = dJ(t) +
M−1∑
i=J(t)
(di+1 − di)
(
L¯J(t)(t)
Ci
)n−1
(5.35)
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Substituting equation (5.35) into equation (5.1) and using the approximation given in
equation (5.22) the expected value can be expressed by
E[p(t)]R =
N+1∑
j=1
E
dJ(t) + M−1∑
i=J(t)
(di+1 − di)
(
L¯J(t)(t)
Ci
)n−1
|J(t) = j
Pr[J(t) = j]
∼=
N+1∑
j=1
[
dj +
M−1∑
i=j
(di+1 − di)
(
Cj
Ci
)n−1]
Pr[J(t) = j] (5.36)
Similarly, the variance can be calculated in (5.2) as
V ar[p(t)]R =
N+1∑
j=1
E
dJ(t) + M−1∑
i=J(t)
(di+1 − di)
(
L¯J(t)(t)
Ci
)n−12 |J(t) = j
Pr[J(t) = j]
−E2[p(t)]R (5.37)
Using the approximation given in (5.22) the variance results
V ar[p(t)]R ∼=
N+1∑
j=1
[
dj +
M−1∑
i=j
(di+1 − di)
(
Cj
Ci
)n−1]2
Pr[J(t) = j]− E2[p(t)]R (5.38)
5.8 SOME COMMENTS ON RUDKEVICH, DUCKWORTH, AND
ROSEN’S FORMULA
As Klemperer and Meyer [43] have shown, a supply function satisfying the definition of a
Nash Equilibrium is generally not unique.
Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen’s formula is based on the assumption that the price at
the peak will equal the marginal cost of the last unit used. In equation (5.35)M denotes the
marginal unit at daily peak. M is then a random variable, with two sources of uncertainty:
the peak load, and the state of the units Yi at the peak hour.
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The peak load is the maximum of L(t) , t = 1, 2, 3, ....., 24. Under the assumption
that L(t) follows a Gauss-Markov process, the distribution of the peak load has a quite
complicated analytical form. Furthermore, the distribution of M is also quite difficult. As
the choice of the SFE is arbitrary, the perception of what M is going to be is more useful
than the actual distribution of M .
The second term of the right side of equation (5.35) varies from day to day. This means
that each day the firms bid different supply functions, according to the forecasted peak unit.
In practice, this is the case. The PJM website shows historical bid data, unit by unit. The
supply function for each unit is not the same every day.
It is assumed that the firms can forecast M with great precision. Therefore, it will
be considered to be a deterministic variable, based on historical data. According to the
perception of M , the supply function bid will be greater or smaller. It is supposed that all
the firms have the same ability to predictM . Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen [63] take the
lowest SFE, which intersects the marginal cost curve at the point of maximum anticipated
demand for that day.
Looking at figure 5.1, if the anticipated maximum demand for the day is the line BC, the
set of feasible solutions, as it was shown, is composed of curves passing through the origin
O and crossing the demand between the points B and C like the curves OC’ and OB’. The
lowest SFE is then the curve OB that crosses the demand curve at point B with slope zero.
B is the anticipated realization of the maximum demand for that day met by supply. Recall
that the straight line OB is the Bertrand solution which is the marginal cost. In other words,
the curve OB is the solution selected by Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen.
On the other hand, the highest SFE is the supply schedule based on the assumption
that each firm behaves as a monopolist in the particular hour of anticipated peak demand,
capped by the maximum allowed price. This is point C in figure 5.1. The highest SFE is
the curve OC, that crosses the demand curve at point C with infinite slope. Recall that the
straight line OC is the Cournot solution.
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Figure 5.1: Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen’s supply function equilibrium solution
Over time, in a repeated game, firms might employ a “tit-for-tat” pricing strategy, by
gradually raising their bid prices. Raising prices can be seen as taking higher values of M ,
which can go up to N , the total number of generators in the market. In figure 5.1, the
curve OB’ is a Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen’s solution taking a higher M . In this way,
Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen’s formula has been generalized to cases other than the
lowest SFE. The study includes sensitivity analysis on M to assess the repercussion on the
expected value and on the variance of prices.
5.9 SUMMARY
This chapter finds expressions for the expected value and variance of hourly electricity prices,
conditioning on the probability distribution of the marginal unit. The concept of equivalent
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load is used to capture the uncertainties of both the load and the reliability of units. It uses
the fact that an outage of a unit is equivalent (for pricing purposes) to an increase of load
in the same amount of energy as the capacity of the failed unit. The formulas explicitly
use system parameters such as number of firms in the market, number of generating units,
elasticity of demand, installed capacity, which allows us to perform sensitivity analysis and
to adapt the model to a change in the system parameters.
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6.0 AVERAGE ELECTRICITY PRICE
Average electricity prices are useful for medium-term decisions, in which the information
on hourly prices is not that useful. The extreme volatility of electricity prices makes it
difficult for the companies to survive in such an unpredictable environment. The firms rely
on a reasonable forecast of the prices. For derivatives pricing, and to hedge the risk against
significant changes in the market price of electricity, the average price for peak and off-peak
hours are of interest. And so they are for making decisions about investments on capacity.
This chapter derives formulas for the expected value and variance of average prices. The
objective is to predict accurately the average price for a given day; or the average for some
specific hours.
6.1 DAILY LOAD PROFILE
A load-weighted average is considered, as a more general approach. The simple average is a
special case.
The weights of the hourly loads are given by
wt =
L(t)∑H
t=I L(t)
where I is the initial hour and H is the final hour of the period under consideration.
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The load-weighted average price for period I to H is
p¯(I,H) =
H∑
t=I
wtp(t) (6.1)
If I = 1 and H = 24, p¯(I,H) is the load-weighted average daily price.
Note that wt and p(t) are correlated, wt being also a random variable. Nevertheless, this
work anticipates that, in general, wt will have much less variability compared to pt.
6.2 EXPECTED VALUE AND VARIANCE OF AVERAGE PRICE
The expected value is straightforward:
E[p¯(I,H)] =
H∑
t=I
wtE[p(t)] (6.2)
using E[p(t)] as derived in the preceding chapter for each bidding model.
The variance requires a more thorough analysis, because p(r) and p(t) are correlated for
any pair r, t. Its formula is
V ar[p¯(I,H)] =
H∑
t=I
w2tV ar[p(t)] + 2
H∑
t=I
H∑
r=t+1
wrwtcov[p(r), p(t)] (6.3)
where the expression for V ar[p(t)] has been derived in the preceding chapter for each bidding
model. But still an expression for cov[p(r), p(t)] is needed.
Using that
cov[p(r), p(t)] = E[p(r)p(t)]− E[p(r)]E[p(t)] (6.4)
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only a formula for E[p(r)p(t)] needs to be found, given that E[p(r)] and E[p(t)] have been
derived in the previous chapter. Conditioning on J(r) and J(t), the following expression
holds
E[p(r)p(t)] =
N+1∑
m=1
N+1∑
l=1
E[p(r)p(t)|J(r) = m, J(t) = l]Pr[J(r) = m, J(t) = l] (6.5)
Sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 give computations of E[p(r)p(t)|J(r) = m, J(t) = l] for the
three models under consideration.
Valenzuela [76] has obtained an approximate expression for Pr[J(r) = m, J(t) = l] using
the Edgeworth expansion formula. The following section summarizes his work.
6.3 MARGINAL UNIT’S BIVARIATE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
Note that
Pr[J(r) = m, J(t) = l] = Pr[J(r) > m− 1, J(t) > l − 1]
−Pr[J(r) > m, J(t) > l − 1]
−Pr[J(r) > m− 1, J(t) > l]
+Pr[J(r) > m, J(t) > l] (6.6)
The events [L(r) −∑mi=1 ciYi(r) > 0, L(t) −∑li=1 ciYi(t) > 0] and [J(r) > m, J(t) > l]
are equivalent. Denoting by pml(r, t) the joint probability of the two events, and using the
variables Xm(r) and Xl(t) defined in equation (5.6), the following equalities hold
pml(r, t) = Pr[J(r) > m, J(t) > l] = Pr[Xm(r) > 0, Xl(t) > 0] (6.7)
Using this notation, equation (6.6) becomes
Pr[J(r) = m, J(t) = l] = pm−1,l−1(r, t)− pm,l−1(r, t)− pm−1,l(r, t) + pm,l(r, t) (6.8)
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The joint probability distribution of [Xm(r), Xl(t)] can be approximated by a bivariate
normal distribution for relatively high values of m and n, because L(r) and Yi(r) are as-
sumed to be independent, for any given r. This normal approximation does not provide
accurate answers when computing tail probabilities and for small values of m or l. A better
approximation is obtained using the Edgeworth expansion.
Iyengar and Mazumdar [41] give the Edgeworth approximate expansion of the joint
probability distribution of [Xm(r), Xl(t)]:
pml(r, t) ∼=
∫ ∞
am(r)
∫ ∞
al(t)
φ2[z1, z2; ρml(r, t)]
{
1 +
1
6
K30
K
3
2
20
H30[z1, z2; ρml(r, t)]
+
1
2
K21
K20K
1
2
02
H21[z1, z2; ρml(r, t)] +
1
2
K12
K
1
2
20K02
H12[z1, z2; ρml(r, t)]
+
1
6
K03
K
3
2
02
H03[z1, z2; ρml(r, t)]
}
dz1dz2 (6.9)
where
am (r) = − K10√
K20
(6.10)
al (t) = − K01√
K02
(6.11)
ρml (r, t) is the correlation coefficient between Xm (r) and Xl (t) given by
ρml (r, t) =
K11√
K20K02
(6.12)
φ2[z1, z2; ρ] is the probability density function of the bivariate standard normal distribution
with correlation coefficient ρ
φ2[z1, z2; ρ] =
1
2pi
√
1− ρ2 exp
[ −1
2 (1− ρ2)
(
z21 − 2ρz1z2 + z22
)]
(6.13)
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Kij is the bivariate cumulant of order (i, j) of [Xm (r) , Xl (t)] given by
K10 = E [Xm (r)] = µr −
m∑
i=1
cipi (6.14)
K01 = E [Xl (t)] = µt −
l∑
i=1
cipi (6.15)
K20 = V ar [Xm (r)] = σ
2
r +
m∑
i=1
c2i piqi (6.16)
K02 = V ar [Xl (t)] = σ
2
t +
l∑
i=1
c2i piqi (6.17)
K11 = Covar [Xm (r) , Xl (t)] = σr,t +
min(m,l)∑
i=1
c2i piqie
−δi|t−r| (6.18)
K12 = K21 =
min(m,l)∑
i=1
c3i piqi (pi − qi) e−δi|t−r| (6.19)
K30 =
m∑
i=1
c3i piqi (pi − qi) (6.20)
K03 =
l∑
i=1
c3i piqi (pi − qi) (6.21)
where µr, µt, σ
2
r , σ
2
t and σr,t are the means, variances and covariances of the hourly loads.
The expressions for K11 and K12 hold only if the up and down times are independently
exponentially distributed, as it is assumed in this work. In them, δi = λi + µi
Note that using the notation defined in equations (5.10) to (5.12) the following equalities
hold:
K10 = K1m (r)
K01 = K1l (t)
K20 = K2m (r)
K02 = K2l (t)
K30 = K3m
K03 = K3l
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Hij[z1, z2; ρ] are the bivariate Hermite polynomials :
H30[z1, z2; ρ] =
(z1 − ρz2)3 − 3(z1 − ρz2)(1− ρ2)
(1− ρ2)3 (6.22)
H21[z1, z2; ρ] =
(z1 − ρz2)2(z2 − ρz1) + 2ρ(1− ρ2)(z1 − ρz2)− (1− ρ2)(z2 − ρz1)
(1− ρ2)3
(6.23)
H12[z1, z2; ρ] =
(z2 − ρz1)2(z1 − ρz2) + 2ρ(1− ρ2)(z2 − ρz1)− (1− ρ2)(z1 − ρz2)
(1− ρ2)3
(6.24)
H03[z1, z2; ρ] =
(z2 − ρz1)3 − 3(z2 − ρz1)(1− ρ2)
(1− ρ2)3 (6.25)
6.4 BERTRAND MODEL
The previous section provides an approximation of the bivariate probability distribution
function for the marginal unit at two different hours Pr[J(r) = m, J(t) = l]. This section
computes the variance of the average price for the Bertrand model.
Knowing that p(t) = dJ(t) for Bertrand model from equation (5.24) the following equality
holds
E[p(r)p(t)|J(r) = m, J(t) = l]B = dmdl (6.26)
Using this in equation (6.5) and the resulting expression in equation (6.4), the covariance
of prices at two different hours is expressed by
cov[p(r), p(t)]B =
N+1∑
m=1
N+1∑
l=1
dmdlPr[J(r) = m, J(t) = l]− E[p(r)]BE[p(t)]B (6.27)
where E[p(r)]B and E[p(t)]B are derived as in equation (5.25).
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Finally, the variance of the average price for the Bertrand model is obtained from equation
(6.3) using
V ar[p¯(I,H)]B =
H∑
t=I
w2tV ar[p(t)]B + 2
H∑
t=I
H∑
r=t+1
wrwtcov[p(r), p(t)]B (6.28)
where V ar[p(t)]B is calculated using equation (5.26).
6.5 COURNOT MODEL
This section derives the variance of the average price for Cournot model, assuming that the
demand D(p, t) is linear with respect to p.
Using equation (5.30) and the approximation of equation (5.22), the following expressions
hold
E[p(r)p(t)|J(r) = m, J(t) = l]C = E
[
dJ(r)dJ(t) − dJ(r)
L¯J(t)(t)
nDp
− dJ(t)
L¯J(r)(r)
nDp
+
L¯J(r)(r)L¯J(t)(t)
n2D2p
|J(r) = m, J(t) = l
]
= dmdl − dm
nDp
E[L¯J(t)(t)|J(t) = l]
− dl
nDp
E[L¯J(r)(r)|J(r) = m]
+
1
n2D2p
E[L¯J(r)(r)L¯J(t)(t)|J(r) = m, J(t) = l]
∼= dmdl − dmCl
nDp
− dlCm
nDp
+
CmCl
n2D2p
=
(
dm − Cm
nDp
)(
dl − Cl
nDp
)
(6.29)
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Using this in equation (6.5) and the resulting expression in equation (6.4) the covariance
of prices at two different hours is expressed by
cov[p(r), p(t)]C ∼=
N+1∑
m=1
N+1∑
l=1
(
dm − Cm
nDp
)(
dl − Cl
nDp
)
Pr[J(r) = m, J(t) = l]
−E[p(r)]CE[p(t)]C (6.30)
where E[p(r)]C and E[p(t)]C are computed as in equation (5.31).
Finally, the variance of the average price for the Cournot model is obtained from equation
(6.3) using
V ar[p¯(I,H)]C =
H∑
t=I
w2tV ar[p(t)]C + 2
H∑
t=I
H∑
r=t+1
wrwtcov[p(r), p(t)]C (6.31)
where V ar[p(t)]C is calculated using equation (5.33).
6.6 SUPPLY FUNCTION EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
This section will compute the variance of the average price for the Rudkevich, Duckworth,
and Rosen’s model.
Using Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen’s formula (equation (5.35)) and the approxima-
tion of equation (5.22) as it has been done for the Cournot model, the following expression
holds
E[p(r)p(t)|J(r) = m, J(t) = l]R ∼=
[
dm +
M−1∑
i=m
(di+1 − di)
(
Cm
Ci
)n−1]
×
[
dl +
M−1∑
i=l
(di+1 − di)
(
Cl
Ci
)n−1]
(6.32)
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Using this in equation (6.5) and the resulting expression in equation (6.4) the covariance
of prices at two different hours is expressed by
cov[p(r), p(t)]R =
N+1∑
m=1
N+1∑
l=1
[
dm +
M−1∑
i=m
(di+1 − di)
(
Cm
Ci
)n−1]
×
[
dl +
M−1∑
i=l
(di+1 − di)
(
Cl
Ci
)n−1]
Pr[J(r) = m, J(t) = l]
−E[p(r)]RE[p(t)]R (6.33)
where E[p(r)]R and E[p(t)]R are computed as in equation (5.36).
Finally, the variance of the average price for the Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen’s
model is obtained from equation (6.3) using
V ar[p¯(I,H)]R =
H∑
t=I
w2tV ar[p(t)]R + 2
H∑
t=I
H∑
r=t+1
wrwtcov[p(r), p(t)]R (6.34)
where V ar[p(t)]R is calculated using equation (5.38).
6.7 SUMMARY
The expected value of the average price is straightforward and can be easily computed from
section 6.2, using the expected values of hourly prices derived in the preceding chapter for
each bidding model.
Sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 present derivations for the variance of the average price for
the three bidding models respectively. The derivations were done using the Edgeworth
approximate expansion of the joint probability distribution Pr[J(r) = m, J(t) = l], shown
in section 6.3.
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7.0 NUMERICAL RESULTS
This chapter provides numerical examples, using the formulas obtained in previous chap-
ters. A supply model, an aggregate load model and the three bidding models are used.
The objective is to compare results across the three bidding models. Sensitivity analysis is
conducted on the number of firms in the market, on the price elasticity of demand and on
the anticipated peak load, in order to obtain the conclusions.
7.1 SUPPLY MODEL
The system will comprise twelve identical sets of eight generators each. The total number of
units in the system will be ninety-six. Table 7.1 shows the characteristics of the generating
units: capacity, production cost, mean time to failure, mean time to repair, and the steady
state proportion of time that it is able to generate power. The total nominal capacity is
18000 MW.
The model considers:
• that infinite amount of energy can be bought outside the system at $75/MWh.
• 4 ownership scenarios of the system: 3, 4, 6, and 12 identical firms, with 4, 3, 2, and 1
8-unit groups each respectively.
• that all the firms forecast the load with the same accuracy.
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It is assumed that the generators are dispatched in a pre-arranged merit order, based on
the offered prices. There exists a positive correlation between bids and production costs.
Table 7.1: Supply model
unit capacity mean time to fail mean time to repair energy cost 1 - FOR
i ci(MW) λ−1i (hour) µ
−1
i (hour) di($/MWh) pi
1 400 1100 150 6.00 0,88
2 350 1150 100 11.40 0,92
3 150 960 40 11.40 0,96
4 150 1960 40 14.40 0,98
5 200 950 50 22.08 0,95
6 100 1200 50 23.00 0,96
7 50 2940 60 27.60 0,98
8 100 450 50 43.50 0,90
7.2 BIDDING MODELS
Three bidding strategies are considered: the Bertrand model, Cournot model and a specific
case of Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE): Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen’s model.
These strategies are the three primary equilibrium models of imperfect competition. They
have in common the assumption that each competing firm seeks to maximize its profit by
taking into account the market conditions, its own cost structure, and estimation of the
behavior of the rivals. The key difference between the models is the strategic competing
variable: price, quantity, or supply function, respectively. The choice of the strategy has
an impact on the level of competition among the firms and the outcome of the equilibrium
price.
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7.3 AGGREGATE LOAD MODEL
Load data from PJM for weekdays of Spring 2002 (March 21 to June 20, 2002) is used in
these illustrations. Table 7.2 shows the mean and standard deviation of the hourly load. It
is assumed that hourly loads follow a normal probability distribution. Standard deviations
are small enough with respect to the mean so that the probability of negative loads can be
neglected. The data points used in the model were scaled by a factor of 0.75 to fit into the
supply model.
Table 7.2: Actual aggregate load model
hour mean standard deviation
t µt(MWh) σt(MWh)
1 24392 2323
2 23256 2088
3 22686 1917
4 22449 1815
5 22854 1769
6 24570 1812
7 27676 1981
8 30283 2072
9 31579 2256
10 32403 2613
11 33135 3091
12 33505 3598
13 33644 4061
14 33889 4519
15 33844 4895
16 33767 5140
17 33717 5166
18 33498 4942
19 33147 4476
20 32913 3973
21 33296 3541
22 32347 3432
23 29663 3079
24 26800 2651
For the Cournot model, a non-zero price elasticity of the demand is proposed. A linear
demand function is used having the formD(t, p) = a(t)+pDp withDp < 0 being deterministic
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and constant across all hours t, and a(t) being a random variable different for every hour.
For the Rudkwevich model, zero price elasticity of demand is required.
7.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Keeping always the same 96-unit system, four scenarios of ownership were investigated:
• 12 identical firms with 8 units each,
• 6 identical firms with 16 units each,
• 4 identical firms with 24 units each, and
• 3 identical firms with 32 units each.
Sensitivity analysis was then performed on the parameters, in the range and with the
reference values given in table 7.3. For the Cournot model, five cases of first derivative Dp
of demand with respect to price were considered for sensitivity analysis purposes: Dp =
−300,−250,−200,−150,−100 (MWh)2/$, reflecting a descending order of price elasticity of
demand . For the Rudkevich model, five beliefs about the anticipated peak demand were
taken into account to measure sensitivity, expressed as a ratio (the peak-demand-to-full-
capacity ratio, PDFCR) : 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1. Bertrand model results play the role of
lower bound in all the cases, except for the variances where the Rudkevich model gives the
lowest values. This issue will be commented upon later.
Table 7.3: Parameters considered for sensitivity analysis
Reference
Parameter Range value
- number of firms 3 – 12 6
- demand slope (MWh)2/$ (Cournot model) -300 – -100 -200
- peak-demand-to-full-capacity ratio (PDFCR) (Rudkevich model) 0.6 – 1.0 0.8
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7.5 RESULTS
The number of firms in the market affects the expected value of the price and the variance. In
all the cases, when the number of firms increases, the results tend to the Bertrand solution.
Especially, the cost and capacity of each unit influence the expected value and variance of
price to an important extent.
7.5.1 Hourly prices
Figure 7.1 shows that the expected values and variances of hourly prices for the Cournot
model follow a similar profile to the Bertrand model, but always stay above it. Only two
cases of demand elasticity are shown (the highest and the lowest), to keep the graphics clear.
The other three cases fall between them.
Both expected values and variances can reach high values when the elasticity of demand
is low. For different values of demand elasticity, expectations and variances with twelve firms
remain around one half those when there are only three firms in the market.
For the Rudkevich model, for low anticipated peak demand, market concentration does
not affect that much the results in both expectations and variances. The expected values
and variances of hourly prices for the Rudkevich model are shown in figure 7.2. Only two
cases of anticipated peak load are given for the sake of clarity. The results for PDFCR=0.6
were equal or very close to the Bertrand solution; therefore they are not included.
In figure 7.2.a, for PDFCR=0.8 the curve of expected values is flatter than in the other
cases, and between hour 9 and hour 22, the differences between ownership scenarios are
very small. As was expected, all the prices are above Bertrand hourly prices. When the
anticipated peak demand is high (close to 1), then the differences are striking. Rudkevich
expected prices for low demand hours are more affected by the fluctuation in demand than
the expected prices for peak hours. This produces the effect of leveling of prices.
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Rudkevich model variances of hourly prices (figure 7.2.b) are less disparate for the dif-
ferent ownership scenarios for PDFCR=0.8. The lower the anticipated peak demand is, the
closer the solutions are to Bertrand’s curve.
Note that, for peak hours, except in the case of 12 firms, Rudkevich’s variances are
smaller than Bertrand’s. The reason for this is that Rudkevich’s supply functions have
smaller slopes than the marginal cost at peak hours. This can be better illustrated by a
diagram.
Figure 7.3.b shows examples1 of Rudkevich supply functions, together with the marginal
cost function (Bertrand solution). It is necessary to note that Rudkevich offer curves, for an-
ticipated peak load ratio less than one, continue beyond the anticipated peak load coinciding
with the marginal cost curve.
In the on-peak load range 19500-20500 MWh (labeled B) the slopes of the Rudkevich
supply functions are lower than the slope of the marginal cost. Thus a fluctuation in the
load at that range produces smaller variations in the prices for the Rudkevich model —for
any value of the anticipated peak load— than for Bertrand’s. On the contrary, in the off-
peak load range 13500-14500 MWh (labeled A) some of the slopes of the Rudkevich supply
functions are lower, while some are higher than the slope of the marginal cost. In this case,
the variances under the Rudkevich model may be smaller or larger than those for Bertrand’s.
In figure 7.3.a, a Cournot solution (for a specific value of Dp whose value is not important
for this purpose) is shown. Note that the slope of the Cournot solution curve always has
a higher slope than the marginal cost curve. Then the variances of hourly prices for the
Cournot model remain always above those for the Bertrand model. Two vertical lines help
to compare slopes for the same load level.
Furthermore, the fewer the number of firms in Rudkevich’s model, the higher are the
expected values, but the smaller are the variances, something which is not intuitive. This
1These examples do not come from the supply model that is used in this work. They come from other
hypothetical supply model, but they are useful for illustrating the point of interest here.
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can be illustrated by figure 7.4, in which Rudkevich supply functions can be compared for
three firms and twelve firms. Especially for a large load, the curves for three firms are flatter
than those for twelve. This explains that the variances for three firms are smaller than those
for twelve.In conclusion, the Rudkevich model has smaller variances than any other model.
7.5.2 Average prices
Two 4-hour averages are studied: at on-peak hours and at off-peak hours. All the cases for
Cournot and Rudkevich are shown in the graphics.
Average for hours 13 to 16: on-peak hours
Figure 7.5 shows the expected values and variances of average price between hours 13
and 16 for the three bidding models, with sensitivity analysis. Results for the Bertrand
model are insensitive to all the parameters, and are taken as references.
As could be intuited, in all the cases the expected values increase when the number of
firms decreases. When the number of firms is large, there is no oligopoly any more, and the
behavior tends to the perfect competition case.
As also could be expected, Cournot average prices (figure 7.5.b) increase when demand
is more inelastic (i.e., Dp decreases in absolute value). The increase may be very high with
respect to Bertrand prices.
Rudkevich expected values (figure 7.5.a) increase with the daily peak load to full capacity
ratio, implying that a bigger peak load for a given day will drag up all the hourly prices of
that day. But markups are not that large for anticipated peak loads less than or equal to
90% of total capacity.
For the Cournot model, variances of average prices (figure 7.5.d) are always above the
Bertrand model case. They also increase when the number of firms decreases, and when
demand is more inelastic.
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On the contrary, Rudkevich model variances of average prices (figure 7.5.c) have quite a
different behavior. The first thing to point out is that the variances are below that for the
Bertrand model for most of the chosen values of peak-demand-to-full-capacity ratio. The
reason for this was explained in the preceding subsection. See figure 7.3.b.
Second, the variances increase with the number of firms. The explanation for this is again
that when the number of firms increase, the market tends to the perfect competition scenario,
so the variances get close to that of the Bertrand model. In addition, with fewer companies
in the market, Rudkevich prices go up and flatten more quickly and, therefore, the slopes of
the supply curves are smaller for relatively higher values of the peak-demand-to-full-capacity
ratio. See figure 7.4.
Third, for values of peak-demand-to-full-capacity ratio PDFCR increasing from 0.6 to
0.9, the variances of average prices decrease in this range of on-peak load. The reason can
be explained through figure 7.3.b. In the range 20500-22000 MWh (labeled C), the slope
of the curve for anticipated peak load = 20000 MWh is the same as marginal cost curve’s
(Bertrands’s)2. For anticipated peak load = 21000 MWh the slope has a very flat part
between 20000 and 20500 MWh, and beyond this range, it follows the marginal cost curve.
So, the variances are smaller than those for anticipated peak load = 20000 MWh. For
anticipated peak load = 22000 MWh, the variances are even lower. But for anticipated peak
load = 23000 MWh, variances may increase.
Average for hours 3 to 6: off-peak hours
Figure 7.6 shows the expected values and variances of average prices between hours 3
and 6 for the three models, including sensitivity analysis. The behavior of the expected
values, for both models —Cournot and Rudkevich— (figures 7.6.a and .b) are similar to the
average for hours 13 to 16, discussed above. Variances of average prices for the Cournot
model (figure 7.6.d) show the same patterns as those of the average for hours 13 to 16, but
they are much smaller.
2Rudkevich offer curves, for anticipated peak load ratio less than one, continue beyond the anticipated
peak load coinciding with the marginal cost curve.
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Once more, the variances of average prices for Rudkevich (figure 7.6.c) have a different
behavior. This time, they are above the Bertrand model for most of the cases. This may
be explained by the fact that Rudkevich offers for low levels of demand have steeper slopes
than Bertrand. This can be seen in figure 7.3.b. At very low load level, say 6000-8000 MWh
of the supply model used in the figure 3, the slopes of Rudkevich supply functions are higher
than those of the marginal cost curve.
In figure 7.6.c variances of average prices are not monotonic with respect to the number
of firms (the lines cross each other). The reason for this may be that the approximation
methods that were used are not very accurate when the variances are small.
7.6 SUMMARY
The number of firms and the cost-capacity structure of the supply model play an important
role when the expected values and variances are compared for the different models. The
latter is reflected in the Bertrand solution operating as a benchmark in most of the cases.
Cournot solutions are very sensitive to the demand elasticity. The more elastic the
market, the cheaper the prices and the smaller the variances. Electricity markets are rather
inelastic; and it is not an easy task to change this. In part this is so, because the end
consumer does not have the opportunity to choose, or is not affected by the changes of
prices in the wholesale market. This way the consumers can not react to changes in prices
that would provide elasticity to the wholesale market. As times passes by, more markets are
offering open access to the end consumers making the market more elastic.
Rudkevich results have less pronounced fluctuations than Cournot outputs. The sensitiv-
ity around the anticipated peak load is more important for off-peak hours. The Rudkevich
3Be aware of that the supply model used in the figure is not the one used in this work, but the example
is useful anyway.
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model helps to level the prices across hours. The variances of hourly prices are usually
smaller for the Rudkevich model than for the Bertrand model. On the contrary, variances
for the Cournot model are always above Bertrand’s. But the variances of average prices in
the Rudkevich model follow different profiles. In peak hours, variances of average prices are
lower than the Bertrand model. In off-peak hours variances are higher.
It seems that designing a wholesale power market to encourage Rudekvich model be-
havior, with a suitable number of competing firms, would result in a better performance
of the market: lower prices and smaller variances. If the Rudkevich model is an accurate
representation of the electricity market, the results show that an introduction of competition
may decrease the expected value of prices but the variances may actually increase with the
increase of the number of competing firms in the market.
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Figure 7.1: Expected values and variances of hourly prices (Cournot model)
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Figure 7.2: Expected values and variances of hourly prices (Rudkevich model)
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Figure 7.3: Supply functions for 6 firms
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Figure 7.4: Rudkevich supply functions for 12 and 3 firms
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Figure 7.5: Expected values and variances of average prices between hours 13 and 16
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Figure 7.6: Expected values and variances of average prices between hours 3 and 6
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8.0 STOCHASTIC MODEL OF THE LOAD
The sources of uncertainty that this work considers are the fluctuations of demand and the
availability of the units. A question arises at this moment: Can we predict electricity prices
more accurately if we can better explain the variability of demand?
Some previous work (see Valenzuela, Mazumdar and Kapoor [81]) showed that part of
the load variance can be explained by the effect of temperature. This chapter studies how
much the predicted quantities of the expected values and variances of hourly prices and
average price change when one takes into account the information available on temperature.
A stochastic model is used: the same as that in Valenzuela [76], who calibrated it based on
a data set containing hourly load and temperature readings for weekdays during March to
September 1996.
Three load models are considered here. The first one takes the hourly loads L(t) as
normally distributed and not independent, as in chapters 5 and 6. The second uses the
information on temperature to explain the load and its variation. The third, in addition to
using the previous information, considers explicitly the correlation of the load from one hour
to the next using a time series approach.
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8.1 REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR HOURLY LOAD WITH
TEMPERATURE AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Ambient temperature is an important factor affecting the magnitude of the short-term vari-
ation in the load as Valenzuela and Mazumdar [77] and Valenzuela, Mazumdar, and Kapoor
[81] show. This and the following sections investigate the change in the expected value and
variance of electricity price when the effect of temperature is taken into account. The model
is the same as in Valenzuela [76], and it is used in two steps.
This section covers the first step, in which the effect of temperature is removed from the
load model; and the remaining terms x(t) for each t are considered normally distributed. In
the second step, it uses the full stochastic model by Valenzuela [76].
Figure 8.1: Demand versus temperature at noon in NE United States (1995-96)
Based on plots like the one shown in figure 8.11, for each hour t of a 24-hour period,
Valenzuela found the following regression equations in which the hourly load L(t) is the
response and the hourly temperature τt(
◦F) is the independent variable.
L(t) = β0,t + β1,tτt + β2,t(τt − 65)δ(τt) + x(t) t = 1, 2, ..., 24 (8.1)
1Source: Valenzuela [76]
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Where δ(τt) is defined as
δ(τt) =
 0 if τt ≤ 651 if τt > 65 (8.2)
The data set was used to estimate the regression coefficients β.,t shown in table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Least-square estimates of regression coefficients
hour t β0,t β1,t β2,t
(MWh) (MWh/◦F) (MWh/◦F)
1 1266.488 -3.043 24.923
2 1228.883 -3.098 23.214
3 1200.436 -2.784 21.825
4 1210.148 -3.110 23.743
5 1252.080 -3.378 25.518
6 1396.442 -4.181 26.683
7 1615.254 -5.040 24.353
8 1730.754 -4.980 25.635
9 1722.957 -4.150 25.587
10 1725.510 -4.286 25.880
11 1779.210 -5.160 26.604
12 1810.045 -5.940 27.871
13 1801.092 -6.194 27.849
14 1828.385 -6.812 28.760
15 1837.352 -7.484 29.619
16 1860.203 -8.327 30.908
17 1890.890 -8.823 30.870
18 1973.484 -10.534 33.116
19 2046.137 -11.728 33.575
20 2055.195 -11.765 33.010
21 2003.196 -10.099 32.082
22 1699.140 -4.486 28.454
23 1524.169 -3.820 28.715
24 1392.461 -3.821 28.062
First the effect of temperature is subtracted from the load, to compute the expected
value and variance of the remaining x(t) for each t. The new expected value and variance of
hourly load are given by
E[L(t)] = β0,t + β1,tτt + β2,t(τt − 65)δ(τt) + E[x(t)] (8.3)
V ar [L(t)] = V ar [x(t)] (8.4)
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One more thing is needed to work with the new model: the computation of the covariance
σr,t between the load at time t and the load at time r, used in equation (6.18). It is
assumed that the temperature can be forecasted accurately, so temperature is considered
as a deterministic variable. Then, all the randomness comes from the term x(t), and the
covariance is then
Covar [L(t), L(r)] = Covar [x(t), x(r)] (8.5)
The Covar[x(t), x(r)] are computed from the historical data set, once the effect of temper-
ature is removed.
Given a temperature forecast, the new expected values, variances and covariances of the
load computed as above in this section, are used as µt, σt, and σr,t in the model of chapters
5 and 6. Thus, different expected values and variances of prices are obtained.
8.2 TIME SERIES FOR HOURLY LOAD WITH TEMPERATURE AS
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
As a second step, the complete model by Valenzuela [76] is used. The hourly load L(t) is
described by equations (8.1) and (8.2) in which x(t) is a time series —from now on denoted
by the symbol xt— following an ARIMA (1,120,0) process of the form
xt = xt−120 + ρ(xt−1 − xt−121) + zt (8.6)
where zt is Gaussian white noise with mean zero and variance σ
2
z = 2032.55 (MWh)
2, and
the estimated ρ, the autocorrelation coefficient for a 1-hour lag, is .879.
The load can be predicted using the following procedure for t = 1, 2, . . . , 24: 1. Based on
forecasted temperature, compute its effect on hourly load. 2. Compute xˆt as a time series,
based on previous data. 3. Compute Lˆ(t) as the sum of steps 1 and 2.
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8.3 MEAN AND VARIANCE OF THE HOURLY LOAD USING THE TIME
SERIES REPRESENTATION
For each t = 1, 2, ..., 24, Lˆ(t), the expected value of L(t) can be calculated given that the
values of the time series are known up to time t = 0.
Lˆ(t) = β0,t + β1,tτt + β2,t(τt − 65)δ(τt) + xˆt t = 1, 2, ..., 24 (8.7)
where xˆt can be recursively computed by
xˆt = xt−120 + ρ[xˆt−1 − xt−121] (8.8)
The recursion provides the following expression with xˆ0 = x0 and xt−120 being known
terms
E[xt] = xˆt = xt−120 + ρt(x0 − x−120) (8.9)
V ar[xt] can be recursively computed by
V ar [xt] = ρ
2V ar [xt−1] + σ2z (8.10)
Following the recursive computation and knowing that V ar [x0] = 0 because x0 is known,
the variance of xt can be expressed by
V ar[xt] =
t−1∑
i=0
ρ2iσ2z (8.11)
Note that the limit for t going to infinity is
lim
t→∞
V ar[xt] =
σ2z
1− ρ2 (8.12)
as Box and Jenkins [14] show for an AR(1) process.
The new values change the probability distribution function of the marginal unit of
section 5.2. The coefficients K1j(t) in equation (5.10) and K2j(t) in equation (5.11) are
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modified because µt and σt changed respectively. K3j and K4j remain the same. Section
8.6 presents an example.
Therefore, new results for the expected values and variances of hourly prices are obtained.
Section 8.8 discusses the numerical results.
8.4 COVARIANCE BETWEEN LOADS AT DIFFERENT HOURS USING
THE TIME SERIES REPRESENTATION
Covariance of xt and xr is necessary to compute the variance of average prices, and it is
given by
Covar [xt, xr] = E[xtxr]− E[xt]E[xr] (8.13)
Without loss of generality, let r be such that r = t + k, with k >= 0. From equation
(8.8) the following equalities hold
E[xr] = E[xt+k] = xt+k−120 + ρ(E[xt+k−1]− xt+k−121)
= xt+k−120 + ρ2(E[xt+k−2]− xt+k−122)
...
= xt+k−120 + ρk(E[xt]− xt−120) (8.14)
with xt+k−120 being a known term, because t+ k can be 24 at most, and it is assumed that
the time series’ terms xi are known for i ≤ 0
Extending (8.6) recursively for xr, xr can be written
xr = xt+k−120 + ρk(xt − xt−120) + ρk−1zt+1 + ρk−2zt+2 + ...+ ρzt+k−1 + zt+k (8.15)
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Then, considering that xt+k−120 and xt−120 are known terms,
E[xtxt+k] = E[xt[xt+k−120 + ρk(xt − xt−120 +
k−1∑
i=0
ρizt+k−i)]]
= E[xt]xt+k−120 + ρkE[x2t ]− ρkE[xt]xt−120 (8.16)
Therefore, the covariance is
Covar[xt, xr] = E[xt]xt+k−120 + ρkE[x2t ]− ρkE[xt]xt−120
−E[xt]xt+k−120 − ρkE[xt]2 + ρkE[xt]xt−120
= ρk(E[x2t ]− E[xt]2)
= ρkV ar[xt]
= ρk
t−1∑
i=0
ρ2iσ2z r = t+ k, k ≥ 0 (8.17)
The limit when t goes to infinity is the well known result
lim
t→∞
Covar[xt, xt+k] = ρ
k σ
2
z
1− ρ2 (8.18)
The new expected values, variances and covariances of hourly loads, found in section 8.3
and in this section, are used as in chapter 6, to compute the expected value and variance of
the average price using this new stochastic model of load. From equations (6.14) to (6.18),
using the new estimates, the new cumulants K10, K01, K20, K02 and K11 are derived. On
the contrary, K12, K30 and K03 remain unchanged. Consequently, equations (6.10), (6.11)
and (6.12) provide the new am(r), al(t) and ρml(r, t) respectively.
A new bivariate probability distribution function of the marginal unit at two different
hours Pr[J(r) = m, J(t) = l] is obtained through equation (6.8), with the new values of
pml(r, t) computed using equation (6.9). Section 8.7 presents an example. Therefore, this
model provides different results for the expected value and variance of average price. Section
8.8 discusses the numerical results.
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8.5 NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF EXPECTED VALUES AND
VARIANCES OF HOURLY LOADS
In this and the following sections, the model of chapters 5 and 6 uses the load and temperature
data sets from which Valenzuela obtained the regression coefficients β.,t, the autocorrelation
coefficient ρ of the time series and the variance σ2z of the Gaussian white noise. In the
present chapter, the supply model is composed of six sets of eight generating units with the
characteristics of table 7.1, instead of twelve sets, as in the previous chapter. The are forty-
eight units in the system, having a maximum capacity of 9000 MW. The Valenzuela model
(mean and standard deviation of the load and of the remaining terms xt, the regression
coefficients β.,t and the standard deviation σz of the Gaussian noise) is scaled by a factor =
4, to fit into the supply system. As a numerical example, the expected value and variance
of the hourly load for a specific day (09/20/96) are computed using these three models, and
are compared to the actual hourly load of that day.
Model 1 considers that L(t) comes from a normal distribution for each t, as in section 7.3.
The L(t) are not independent. The mean µt, the standard deviation σt and the covariances
σr,t were obtained from the historical data set of load L(t).
Model 2 uses the known effect of temperature and the remaining term x(t) has a normal
distribution for each t, as in section 8.1. The x(t) are not independent. The mean µt, the
standard deviation σt and covariances σr,t were obtained using equations (8.3)-(8.5) with
historical data of temperature and load.
Model 3 also takes into account the temperature effect but considers xt as an ARIMA
process, as in sections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4. The mean µt, the standard deviation σt and co-
variances σr,t were obtained using equations (8.9), (8.11), and (8.17) respectively with the
historical data on temperature and load.
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 give the expected values and variances of hourly load using the three
models, for a given forecasted temperature, and the actual load for 09/20/96. Figure 8.2
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graphically show the same information. As expected, the variances for model 2 turn out to
be smaller for every hour than those for model 1.
Model 1 show large variances, especially for on-peak hours. Model 2 and 3, on the
contrary, have smaller variances, which proves that a great part of the variance of the hourly
load is explained by the temperature effect. This is the main reason for considering models
2 and 3 as refinements of model 1.
Models 2 and 3 are close to each other for the expected values as is expected. But there
are significant differences for the variances. Model 3 fails to capture the cyclic nature of the
load. For some hours (e.g., 4 to 15) the results of method 3 are more accurate than the
outputs of method 2. This is because the remaining term x(t) of load, after removing the
effect of temperature, show a smaller variance than the theoretical variance of the time series
model. Furthermore, for some hours (e.g., 6 to 10) even the variance of the load is smaller
than that of the time series model. See table 8.3.
Model 3 was calculated as if the load at hour 24 of the preceding day was known. This
means that the model predicts the loads for the following 24 hours. This may not be the
actual case, in practice. PJM market, for example, requires the firms to submit the bids at
noon of the preceding day. That is, the firms have to predict the loads for the following 36
hours, although they will use only the last 24 hours to decide on the bids. Consequently, the
expected values and variances of model 3 will change.
Model 3 does not present advantages over model 2 to study the load variance. The
two parameters of the time series xt (the autocorrelation coefficient ρ and the white noise
variance σ2z) which define the variance in equation (8.11) contain less information than the
data set on x(t).
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8.6 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARGINAL UNIT
With the data used in the preceding section, the probability distributions of the marginal
unit under the three load models are computed here.
Figures 8.3 - 8.5 show three sets of probability density functions of the marginal unit for
each hour t, corresponding to the different load models:
1. computed as in section 5.2 using the load data for every hour,
2. considering the temperature effect and computed as in section 8.1, and
3. computed as a time series, accounting for the effect of temperature, as in section 8.3.
The surface of model 1 appears to be lower and wider than the others, showing a larger
variance.
Looking more deeply into it, figure 8.6 shows the probability density functions of the
marginal unit at hours 7 and 17. Each graph shows three curves corresponding to the three
load models mentioned above.
At hour 7, model 3 provides a higher expected value. It does not seem to make a big
difference in the variances of the load. At hour 17, model 1 shows a larger variance.
8.7 MARGINAL UNIT’S BIVARIATE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
There are
23 ∗ 24
2
= 276 bivariate probability distribution functions; and it is not practical
to show all of them. As an example, figures 8.7 - 8.9 depict the joint probability distribution
function of the marginal units at hours 7 and 12. Model 1 depicts a lower and wider surface
than models 2 and 3, which is consistent. The three surfaces are moved to the left, showing
that the load is usually bigger at 12 than at 7.
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8.8 RESULTS
After running the three load models, the outputs are compared to extract some conclu-
sions. Figure 8.10 shows the expected values and variances of hourly prices under three
load models and three bidding models. Rudkevich model was selected with a peak-load-to-
full-capacity ratio of 80% and Cournot model was selected with a demand-to-price slope of
Dp = −200(MWh)2/$. Rudkevich model’s expected values are close to Cournot model’s for
low demand hours, and closer to Bertrand model’s for peak hours. There do not appear to
be great differences between load models. On the contrary, the variances of hourly prices
show a huge difference between load models. Variances at peak hours are extreme for model
1, being twice to five times larger than in the other two models. Across bidding models,
Rudkevich model’s variances for hours 6 to 23 are half of Cournot model’s.
Figure 8.11 depicts the expected values and variances of average prices between hour
13 and hour 18 for the three load models and the three bidding models. In this case,
all Rudkevich’s and Cournot’s scenarios are shown. There are no big changes in expected
values of average prices across load models. Rudkevich model’s expected value of average
price increases a lot for a forecasted peak demand close to full capacity. Also, in this case,
variances of average price are much larger for model 1.
8.9 SUMMARY
As was anticipated, temperature plays an important role in the expected value and variance
of hourly prices and average prices. Forecasting temperature accurately can reduce the
variance of prices considerably.
Time series analysis of the load, somehow underestimates its cyclic nature. For example,
from historical data it appears that the variance of prices at early hours in the morning is
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very small. For these specific hours, the time series analysis does not provide more accurate
estimates. The reason is that the data set contains more information hour by hour than can
be captured by a single time series model.
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Table 8.2: Expected value of hourly load for 09/20/96 (3 models)
Hour Temperature Actual load Load model 1 Load model 2 Load model 3
t τt E[L(t)] E[L(t)] E[L(t)]
◦F MWh MWh MWh MWh
1 59 1087 1185 1104 1110
2 57 1041 1129 1069 1081
3 56 1028 1103 1059 1067
4 54 996 1092 1058 1074
5 53 1035 1115 1090 1084
6 52 1139 1214 1198 1239
7 50 1325 1382 1385 1463
8 52 1440 1504 1493 1549
9 55 1456 1559 1514 1600
10 59 1469 1581 1490 1561
11 64 1501 1616 1467 1521
12 68 1504 1632 1508 1575
13 72 1497 1630 1568 1604
14 73 1505 1644 1582 1575
15 77 1476 1629 1637 1635
16 77 1470 1616 1611 1634
17 79 1436 1612 1645 1619
18 77 1415 1591 1579 1573
19 75 1374 1565 1518 1533
20 70 1399 1544 1414 1496
21 63 1408 1569 1384 1435
22 61 1379 1583 1443 1413
23 59 1242 1431 1315 1285
24 58 1116 1283 1183 1119
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Table 8.3: Variance of hourly load for 09/20/96 (3 models)
Hour Load model 1 Load model 2 Load model 3
t V ar[L(t)] V ar[x(t)] V ar[xt]
(MWh)2 (MWh)2 (MWh)2
1 11050 5930 2027
2 8810 5132 3597
3 7546 4739 4814
4 6303 3805 5757
5 6065 3616 6488
6 5748 3376 7054
7 6433 3571 7493
8 5890 3049 7833
9 5337 2649 8096
10 7791 3017 8301
11 11382 2966 8459
12 16558 3865 8581
13 21638 4800 8676
14 27061 5084 8750
15 30767 6993 8807
16 33479 8626 8851
17 34680 9787 8885
18 33134 11899 8912
19 27981 12551 8933
20 23138 12303 8949
21 19910 10747 8961
22 17563 6914 8970
23 15263 5580 8978
24 13308 5665 8984
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Figure 8.2: Expected values and variances of hourly load for 09/20/96 (3 models)
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Figure 8.3: Probability distribution functions of marginal unit (Load model 1)
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Figure 8.4: Probability distribution functions of marginal unit (Load model 2)
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Figure 8.5: Probability distribution functions of marginal unit (Load model 3)
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Figure 8.6: Probability distribution functions of marginal unit at two hours
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Figure 8.7: Joint probability distribution function of marginal units (Load model 1)
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Figure 8.8: Joint probability distribution function of marginal units (Load model 2)
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Figure 8.9: Joint probability distribution function of marginal units (Load model 3)
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Figure 8.10: Expected values and variances of hourly prices
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Figure 8.11: Expected values and variances of average prices
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9.0 CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
9.1 SUMMARY
The high volatility that wholesale electricity prices have shown in deregulated markets makes
it necessary for electricity generating companies and electricity distribution firms to predict
at least the expected value and variance of electricity prices, in order to make better decisions
and to survive in such a challenging environment. A reasonable estimate of variance is needed
as well to hedge the risk against significant changes in the market prices of electricity.
Deregulation, a global trend that started twenty-six years ago, was intended to provide
efficiency to the market: lower prices, sound investments and better service. Contrary to
expectations, electricity prices under deregulation have been above the marginal cost instead
of being equal to it. The electricity markets which have been opened to competition have
turned out to be oligopolies. This fact explains to some degree the high prices and their
large variability.
Other issues that affect the price and its variance are the peculiarities of the power
industry. Electricity can not be stored easily and in great quantities. Hence, it must be
produced and delivered instantly. Transmission has specific physical laws. Electricity takes
the path of less resistance and travels at the speed of light. Weather and other climatic
events, wars, severe changes in the prices of oil and other factors that cannot be controlled,
influence the power price.
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The exposure of participants in the wholesale power market to price variability, makes
it convenient to put in place an energy derivatives market, to hedge the risk associated with
the uncertainty. This gives rise to the need for derivatives valuation and risk measurement.
Consequently, it is also necessary to estimate beforehand the variance of prices.
For the reasons mentioned above, there have been many attempts to model electricity
prices. Chapter 4 presents the modeling trends and a classification of the different models
that exist in the literature. An important aspect to be considered is the behavior of the
competing firms which react to the market rules. Three paradigmatic models for oligopolies
are studied: the Bertrand model, the Cournot model, and the Supply Function Equilibrium
(SFE) model. Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen’s solution was chosen as the a SFE be-
cause it is a realistic stepwise supply function and it has a nice closed form solution to the
theoretical model’s differential equation.
A fundamental stochastic model, combining the engineering process of production and
the economic process of bidding and clearing price, is presented in this work to obtain the
expected values and variances of hourly and average electricity prices. Some assumptions
(which are also limitations to the work) are needed to get a useful model. The most important
one is considering that the n firms competing in the market are identical.
The core of the dissertation lies in chapters 5 and 6 in which closed form expressions for
the expected values and variances for hourly and average prices are presented respectively
for the three bidding models in each case.
Chapter 5 relies mainly on the probability distribution function of the marginal unit.
Based on this, the expected values and variances of marginal cost and of the hourly prices
for the three bidding models are derived.
Chapter 6 presents the expressions for prices averaged over specified periods. Similar
to the previous chapter, the basis of this chapter is the bivariate probability distribution
function of the marginal unit at two different times.
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A code written in Matlab is used to run the model. Chapter 7 depicts the numerical
data for the inputs and for the outputs with the range of parameters to conduct sensitivity
analysis. The conclusions are presented in the following section.
Finally, a refinement of the model is given in chapter 8. The effect of temperature on
the load is studied, and it turns out that temperature can explain a great portion of the
variance of prices. Two models are shown as alternatives to the original one of chapters 5
and 6. In the first of these two models, the temperature effect is removed from the load by
regression equations and the remaining stochastic term is considered normally distributed
but not independent. The second studies this term as a time series making explicit the
autocorrelation of the data. Once again, the program written in Matlab is used to obtain
numerical examples and to derive the conclusions presented below.
9.2 CONCLUSIONS
The numerical results of chapter 7 are rich enough to derive some conclusions in the following
respects: price behavior with regard to market concentration, price reaction to demand
elasticity and installed capacity.
Computations made using the models of chapter 8 allow us to arrive at some conclusions
on the effect of temperature on expected prices and variances, and to assess the usefulness
of a time series analysis of the load.
9.2.1 Market concentration
Market concentration is an important factor in the determination of the expected value and
the variance of hourly and average prices, especially in the Cournot model for all values
of demand elasticity. In the Rudkevich model, at on-peak hours and for a not very high
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anticipated peak demand, market concentration does not affect prices as much as it does at
off-peak hours. With a small number of firms in the market prices tend to level off across
hours. In the Rudkevich model, the greater the number of firms, the lower the prices are
and the greater the variances.
What should be the most suitable and feasible number of firms in the market to assure
efficiency? This question is important in the designing of the deregulated markets and its
response depends on the cost-capacity structure and the market size. This work provides
insights to answer this question.
9.2.2 Price reaction to demand elasticity
The Cournot model helps us to understand and to measure the effect of price elasticity of
demand. As is to be expected, a large elasticity brings the prices down and the variances
as well. A significant part of the demand is totally inelastic because it is needed not matter
at what price. The remaining part of the demand shows more elasticity. A key factor is to
design the market structure in such a way that it provides this elasticity. In order to do
this, it is necessary to allow the end consumers to react to different prices in the wholesale
market even though they buy energy in the retail market. This change should be carefully
considered by the market designers as an important part of the deregulation process.
9.2.3 Installed capacity
The Rudkevich model has the advantage of showing the effect of the entire supply system
on the prices. Prices are affected by the cost-capacity structure of the market, even by those
units that are not running in a given hour. It is clear that if the market has much more
capacity than needed it can assure a better service because it has a lot of energy reserve, and
the buyers will appreciate that up to a certain point. Eventually, the firms will charge a bit
more to compensate for the investment on the excess capacity. Even for a market which does
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not have a large excess capacity, the perception of the firms about the daily peak demand
affects the price, under the Rudkevich model. The difference between an anticipated peak
demand of 90% and of 100% turns out to be important. Then, the question to think about
is how to influence the firms’ beliefs.
9.2.4 Effect of temperature on the expected prices and variances
Temperature can explain in great part the variance of the load. In the example shown in
chapter 8, for on-peak hours temperature explains up to 75% of the variance of the load and,
what is more useful for this work, of the variance of the prices. In calibrating a good model
to a real market the reduction of variance on prices can be important. This reduction in
variance and therefore in the prediction error, may help companies to forecast prices more
accurately and to make better decisions.
9.2.5 Time series analysis of the load
In addition to considering the effect of temperature a time series analysis was performed, to
study the correlation between hourly loads. The resulting expected values and variances of
the prices do no differ significantly from those obtained using just the temperature effect.
Temperature plays a more important role in determining the hourly load than the load in
the preceding hour. What is also true is that the hourly temperature are very correlated
between them. Thus, there does not appear much reason to perform a rigorous time series
analysis of the remaining term for this purpose.
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9.3 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This work can be extended in a number of ways, towards more realistic situations by in-
creasing its complexity. Some recommendations follow.
Calibrating the model for a real market. With real data from the cost-capacity struc-
ture, the actual offers, the actual hourly loads and the hourly prices, it will be possible to
choose the most suitable model for that market.
Incorporating fuel cost as another source of uncertainty. In the model, the fuel costs
were considered deterministic variables because their variability is not that great. But, in
fact, they are random variables that add uncertainty to the process.
Extending the model for asymmetric firms. In this case there will not be closed formulas
to work with but it will perhaps be possible to get results with optimization or simulation
techniques.
Incorporating transmission constraints. In fact, the prices in a market are location de-
pendent. Due to transmission constraints, prices in one node may differ from prices in
another node. The merit order is then broken. Optimization techniques are appropriate for
this problem.
Incorporating the unit commitment problem. The merit order is also broken several
times because of technical aspects of the generating units such as start-up costs and start-up
and shut-down times that make it more efficient to keep running more expensive units.
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APPENDIX
THE EQUIVALENT LOAD
A.1 EXPECTED VALUE AND VARIANCE OF THE EQUIVALENT LOAD
USING EDGEWORTH APPROXIMATION
The cumulative distribution function of the random variable L¯j (t) is denoted by Fj (x; t),
and the probability density function of L¯j (t) by fj (x; t).
Note that the cumulative distribution functions Fj(x; t) and Gj(0; t) (the latter defined in
section 5.2 as the cumulative distribution function of Xj(t)) are linked between them because
the correspondent random variables L¯j(t) and Xj(t) are obviously related. In the following
appendix, the formula for Pr[J(t) = j] is derived using the two cumulative distribution
functions, showing the relationship between them.
Using that
E
[
L¯j (t) |Cj−1 < L¯j (t) ≤ Cj
]
=
Cj∫
Cj−1
xfj(x; t)dx
Pr
[
Cj−1 < L¯j (t) ≤ Cj
] (.1)
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equation (5.20) becomes
E
[
L¯J(t) (t)
]
=
N+1∑
j=1
Cj∫
Cj−1
xfj (x; t) dx
Pr
[
Cj−1 < L¯j (t) ≤ Cj
]Pr [J (t) = j] (.2)
Because Pr [J (t) = j] = Pr
[
Cj−1 < L¯ (j) ≤ Cj
]
equation (.2) can be written as
E
[
L¯J(t) (t)
]
=
N+1∑
j=1
Cj∫
Cj−1
xfj (x; t) dx (.3)
To compute fj (x; t), the Edgeworth approximation given in Cramer [20] is used
fj(x; t) ∼= 1
K2j(t)1/2
φ(z)
[
1 +
1
6
K3j
K2j(t)3/2
(z3 − 3z) + 1
24
K4j
K2j(t)2
(z4 − 6z2 + 3)
+
1
72
K32j
K2j(t)3
(z6 − 15z4 + 45z2 − 15)
]
(.4)
where
z = zj (x; t) =
x− K¯1j (t)√
K2j(t)
(.5)
K¯1j(t) = µt+
j∑
i=1
ciqi, and K2j(t), K3j and K4j are the same as defined in equations (5.11)
to (5.13).
A similar procedure is used to compute the variance
V ar
[
L¯j(t)
2
]
= E
[
L¯J(t)(t)
2
]− E2 [L¯J(t)(t)] (.6)
where
E
[
L¯J(t)(t)
2
]
=
N+1∑
j=1
E
[
L¯J(t)(t)
2|J(t) = j]Pr [J(t) = j] (.7)
The conditional expectation of L¯j(t)
2 is
E
[
L¯J(t)(t)
2|J(t) = j] = E [L¯J(t)(t)2|Cj−1 < L¯J(t)(t) ≤ Cj]
=
Cj∫
Cj−1
x2fj(x; t)dx
Pr
[
Cj−1 < L¯j ≤ Cj
] (.8)
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Equation (.7) becomes
E
[
L¯J(t)(t)
2
]
=
N+1∑
j=1
Cj∫
Cj−1
x2fj(x; t)dx (.9)
Using this expression in equation (.6), the variance is given by
V ar
[
L¯J(t)(t)
]
=
N+1∑
j=1
Cj∫
Cj−1
x2fj(x; t)dx−
N+1∑
j=1
Cj∫
Cj−1
xfj(x; t)dx

2
(.10)
A point to note is that with due patience equations (.3) and (.10) can be evaluated in a
closed form.
A.2 RELATION BETWEEN EQUIVALENT LOAD AND EXCESS OF
LOAD NOT MET
In the preceding appendix, it was mentioned that Fj(x; t) andGj(0; t), cumulative probability
distribution functions of L¯j(t) and Xj(t) respectively, are related. In this appendix, two
formulas are derived for Pr[J(t) = j] using both cumulative distribution functions, and
showing the relationship between them.
It can be shown that Gj(0; t) = Fj(Cj; t)
Recall that
Gj(0; t) = Pr [Xj(t) ≤ 0]
= Pr
[
L(t)−
j∑
i=1
ciYi(t) ≤ 0
]
= Pr
[
L(t)−
j∑
i=1
ciYi(t) +
j∑
i=1
ci ≤ Cj
]
= Pr
[
L¯j(t) ≤ Cj
]
= Fj(Cj; t)
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Similarly Gj−1(0; t) = Pr
[
L¯j−1(t) ≤ Cj−1
]
.
Note that J(t) = j implies Yj(t) = 1. Therefore, given that J(t) = j, then
L¯j(t) = L(t) +
j∑
i=1
(1− Yi (t))ci = L(t) +
j−1∑
i=1
(1− Yi(t))ci = L¯j−1(t)
So
Gj−1(0; t) = Pr
[
L¯j−1(t) ≤ Cj−1
]
= Pr
[
L¯j(t) ≤ Cj−1
]
= Fj(Cj−1; t)
And
Pr [J(t) = j] = Gj(0; t)−Gj−1(0; t)
= Fj(Cj; t)− Fj(Cj−1; t)
= Pr
[
Cj−1 < L¯j(t) ≤ Cj
]
A.3 EQUIVALENT LOAD APPROXIMATION
In section 5.4 an approximation of L¯J(t)(t) was performed to make the computations easier.
Table A1 shows the results of running the model in chapters 5 and 6 using the two possible
limits of L¯J(t)(t), namely Cj and Cj−1, for the 96-unit system. The parameter considered
for the Cournot model is a demand slope of −200 (MWh)2/$. For the Rudkevich model,
the capacity used at peak demand is assumed to be 81%. Expected values and variances
of average price between hours 14 and 15, and of prices at hours 5 and 20 are shown for
both models. The 96 units are supposed to be owned by 6 identical firms. Bertrand model’s
results are not affected by the approximation.
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Differences are very small in absolute values, as it can be seen, and also in percentage.
Thus the use of the approximation (namely, replacement of L¯J(t)(t) by Cj) appears to be
justified. The use of Cj gives always the upper bound to the expected value. It is not
necessarily the case for the variance.
Table A1: Justification of the use of an approximate equivalent load
using Cj using Cj−1 difference %
Expected Value of Average Price ($/MWh)
Cournot 33.64 33.45 0.19 0.6%
Rudkevich 23.58 23.49 0.09 0.4%
Variance of Average Price ($/MWh)2
Cournot 117.39 110.81 6.58 5.6%
Rudkevich 67.35 68.16 -0.81 -1.2%
Expected Value of Hourly Prices ($/MWh)
hour 5
Cournot 19.65 19.47 0.18 0.9%
Rudkevich 15.29 14.95 0.34 2.2%
hour 20
Cournot 31.58 31.43 0.15 0.5%
Rudkevich 22.16 22.04 0.12 0.5%
Variance of Hourly Prices ($/MWh)2
hour 5
Cournot 1.98 2.09 -0.11 -5.6%
Rudkevich 2.82 2.83 -0.01 -0.4%
hour 20
Cournot 55.67 54.08 1.59 2.9%
Rudkevich 22.76 23.33 -0.57 -2.5%
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